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A Political-choice Approach to Limiting

Prejudicial Evidencet
J. ALEXANDER TANFoRD*

INTRODUCTION
Trials are complex legal, social, and political events. They are supposed
to simultaneously resolve disputes efficiently, utilize adversarial procedures,
determine the truth, inspire public confidence in the legal system, and help
define the limits of acceptable social behavior. The rules of evidence are
expected to facilitate achieving these goals by regulating the flow of information to the jury. If evidence threatens to frustrate these objectives, by
wasting time, confusing the issues, or arousing the emotions of jurors, it
should be excluded. One of the primary vehicles for accomplishing this task
is the prejudice rule, exemplified by Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
Separating prejudicial from valuable evidence becomes problematic when
an item of evidence simultaneously furthers some of the trial's goals and
frustrates others. Consider, for example, whether to allow evidence of the
defendant's prior alcohol-related problems in a drunk driving case.' Admitting the evidence is consistent with the adversarial principle that the
parties select the evidence, fosters informed decisionmaking by giving the
jury accurate information about the defendant, and makes a symbolic
statement that repeated intoxication is unacceptable behavior. It also increases the likelihood of a conviction and severe sentence, and will legitimate
the state's exercise of power, help convince the public that the government
is doing something about the drunk driving problem, and promote public
order and safety. On the negative side, admitting evidence of prior intoxication takes up additional trial time, might distract the jury's attention
away from the merits of the specific charge, increases the likelihood that
the jurors will become angry at the defendant and lose their impartiality,
and to the extent that it makes embarrassing information about the defendant public, undermines the ideology of individual dignity. Using a person's
past against him also clashes with the ideology of rehabilitation, finality,
t @ Copyright 1989 by J. Alexander Tanford.
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington. Helpful
comments and criticisms were provided by Bryant Garth, Bill Popkin, Don Gjerdingen, and
Terry Bethel. The bulk of the research for this article was conducted while the author was a
Visiting Scholar at the University of Iowa, and I am indebted to Dean William Hines and the
College of Law for their assistance and support.
1. See People v. Grisham, 125 Mich. App. 280, 285-86, 335 N.W.2d 680, 683 (1983).
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and paying one's debt to society. Evidence of prior intoxicated behavior
helps determine the truth of the current charge if the defendant is in fact

guilty, but misleads the jury if the defendant was not guilty this time.
Whether a court decides to admit or to exclude evidence that is both
relevant and prejudicial, its decision will promote some values at the expense

of others. When values conflict, and it becomes impossible to further all
desirable social goals at once, difficult political choices have to be made

favoring some principles over others. Usually, such decisions are made by
the legislature or the appellate courts. However, the task of regulating

prejudicial evidence has been delegated to trial judges by Federal Rule of
Evidence 4032 and its common law antecedents. Allocating such broad

power to trial judges to make individualized decisions about the relative
importance of competing principles is inconsistent with the general hierar-

chical structure of our legal system. Trial judges customarily exercise more
limited, reviewable discretion within a framework of standards set by higher

authority.'
The absence of guidance from appellate courts would be inconsequential

if trial judges could be trusted to simply recognize prejudice, like obscenity,
when they see it. Empirical research casts doubt on this proposition.4 The
absence of standards also might be unimportant if trial judges could be

trusted to act without bias.' Empirical research casts doubt on this proposition also, suggesting that judges in reality make decisions consistent with

2. FED. R. Evm. 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Twenty-five states have adopted the rule as
written. Aiz. R. EviD. 403 (1977); ARK. R. Evim. 403 (1975); CoLo. R. Evro. 403 (1980);
DEL. R. Evm. 403 (1980); HAw. R. Evm. 403 (1980); IDAHO R. EvID. 403 (1985); IowA R.
Evm. 403 (1983); ME. R. Evw. 403 (1976); MICH. R. Evm. 403 (1978); MimN. R. Evm. 403
(1977); Miss. R. Evm. 403 (1986); MONT. R. Evm. 403 (1977); NEV. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 48.035
(Michie 1971); N.H. R. Evm. 403 (1985); N.M. STAT. Am. § 11-403 (1973); N.C. R. Evil.
403 (1984); N.D. R. Evi. 403 (1977); OR. REv. STAT. § 40.160 (1981); S.D. CODIFMD LAWS
ANN. § 19-12-3 (1978); UTAH R. Evro. 403 (1983); VT. R. EviD. 403 (1983); WAsH. R. EvIn.
403 (1979); W. VA. R. EviD. 403 (1985); Wis. STAT. Ar. § 904.03 (West 1974); Wyo. R.
Evir. 403 (1978). Five other states adopted modified versions of Rule 403: ALAsKA R. Evro.
403 (1979) (deleted "substantially"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.403 (West 1978) (deleted "or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time"); Omo R. Evm. 403 (1980) (deleted "waste of
time"); OKLA. STAT. Am. tit. 12, § 2403 (West 1980) (deleted "waste of time" but added
"or unfair and harmful surprise"); TEx. R. Evil. 403 (1983) (deleted "waste of time").
3. See R. DwoRKN, TAKING Rionrs SERiousLY 31-39 (1977); Christie, An Essay on
Discretion, 1986 DuKE L.J. 747, 750-54.
4. Teitelbaum, Sutton-Barbere & Johnson, Evaluating the PrejudicialEffect of Evidence:
Can Judges Identify the Impact of Improper Evidence on Juries?, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 1147,
1163-73 (demonstrating significant disagreement among lawyers, as surrogate judges, concerning
the prejudicial effect of a wide range of different kinds of evidence).
5. McElroy, Some Observations Concerning the Discretion Reposed in Trial Judges by
the American Law Institute's Code of Evidence, in MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 356, 357-58
(1942).

1989]

PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE

their political orientation. 6 The current rule's incoherent requirement that
uncertain amounts of probative value be balanced against uncertain amounts
of prejudice would be trivial if judges were able to reach fairly consistent
decisions in practice. Unfortunately, the cases show wide variation in results.
The variation in results may be partly attributable to the lack of agreement
about what prejudice means. For example, in jurisdictions that have adopted
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, courts may exclude relevant evidence for the
sake of efficiency, to prevent "undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." 8 In others, courts have held that
evidence should never be excluded because it is repetitious, 9 or that efficiency
rarely justifies exclusion. 10 Some courts approve excluding relevant evidence
to prevent prejudicing jurors against a party," while others say that harm
2
to a party can never be grounds for exclusion.'
Assuming agreement could be reached on the definition of prejudice,
variation in decisions probably would not be significantly reduced unless a
workable procedure were available for applying the rule. The usual description of the procedure as a balancing of probative value against prejudicial
effect is problematic. Assigning the initial weights to an item's probative
value and prejudicial effect is, like Goldilocks' decision about the relative
merits of beds and porridges, a question of personal bias. Even if it were
possible to quantify the two concepts, judges still would face the metaphysical task of balancing incommensurable qualities. 3 By adopting a
balancing test paradigm, the appellate courts have avoided setting standards,
and simply delegated decisionmaking to the trial judges, and thus guaranteed
4
a wide diversity of results.

6. See, e.g., Champagne & Nagel, The Psychology of Judging, in THE

PSYCHOLOGY OF

Tm COumTROOM 257 (N. Kerr & R. Bray eds. 1982) (summarizing research).

7. E.g., compare State v. Rodriquez, 145 Ariz. 157, 167-68, 700 P.2d 855, 865-66 (1985)
(testimony of expert witness on unreliability of eyewitness identification excluded) with State
v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 292-96, 660 P.2d 1208, 1219-23 (1983) (testimony of expert witness
on unreliability of eyewitness identification admitted). See also Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S.
496, 508 (1987) (majority finds family's expression of grief and anger in victim impact statement
would "inflame the jury and divert it from deciding the case on the relevant evidence"); id.
at 2542 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disagreeing that such evidence is unfair).
8. FED. R. Evm. 403.

9. E.g., People v. McKibbons, 96 II. 2d 176, 449 N.E.2d 821 (common law), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 844 (1983); State v. Hutchinson, 99 N.M. 616, 625, 661 P.2d 1315, 1324 (1983)
(decided under state version of Rule 403).
10. See Gold, Limiting JudicialDiscretion to Exclude PrejudicialEvidence, 18 U.C. DAvis
L. REv. 59, 65 (1984).
11. E.g., Grisham, 125 Mich. App. at 285-86, 335 N.W.2d at 683 (prejudice to defendant);
State v. Beachnian, 189 Mont. 400, 616 P.2d 337 (1980) (prejudice to state).
12. E.g., Pettitt v. Lizotte, 454 A.2d 329, 332 (Me. 1982); Christensen v. Economy Fire
& Cas. Co., 77 Wis. 2d 50, 61-62, 252 N.W.2d 81, 87 (1977).
13. See Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PrrT. L. Ray. 1, 8 n.26, 50-52 (1983).
14. CompareDial v. Travelers Indem. Co., 780 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1986) (evidence defendant
collected insurance on other fires offered to prove motive for arson; on balance admissible)
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This article suggests a new approach to the problem of what to do with

relevant but prejudicial evidence. It develops a comprehensive theory for
limiting prejudicial evidence more consistent with contemporary jurisprudence. That theory conceives of the admissibility decision as a political
choice among conflicting values. Part I analyzes whether a prejudice rule
is even needed by examining the consequences of abandoning it. Part II
proposes a way to resolve disagreements over the appropriate meanings of
prejudice by grounding a general definition in the theory that trials serve
multiple functions. Part III criticizes the conventional balancing test paradigm, and proposes an alternative procedural model based on the premise
that in order to decide the admissibility of prejudicial evidence, the courts
must make political choices. It argues that the political-choice model better
describes the cases, more appropriately allocates policy-making to the appellate courts, and is more consistent with contemporary jurisprudential
principles.
I.

THE

JUSTIFICATION FOR A PREJUDICE RULE

The prejudice rule has ancient roots. Thayer traced its origins back to
the thirteenth century,' 5 although trials at that time had neither witness

testimony nor formal rules of evidence as we know them. 16 Certainly by
the late 1600's, a rule was in place permitting the exclusion of relevant

evidence likely to confuse the jury, 17 unfairly surprise the opponent who
might not be prepared to respond," delay the trial, 19 or arouse the passions

of jurors. 20 In some form or other, a prejudice rule has been incorporated

with Roberts v. State, 163 Ga. App. 92, 93-94, 293 S.E.2d 40, 41-42 (evidence defendant
collected insurance on other fires offered to prove motive for arson; on balance too prejudicial
to be admitted), rev'd, 250 Ga. 414, 297 S.E.2d 274 (1982).
15. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 516 (1898).
16. See 1 W. HOLDSWORTHI, A HISTORY OF ENoLISHi LAW 302-08 (7th ed. 1956).
17. E.g., Trial of Ambrose Rookwood, 13 Howell, St. Tr. 139, 209-12 (1696) (introduction
of certain evidence would lead to confusion).
18. See Trial of Christopher Layer, 16 Howell, St. Tr. 93, 246, 256 (1722) (evidence
surprises witness who cannot be prepared to defend); Trial of Ambrose Rookwood, 13 Howell,
St. Tr. at 209-12 (introduction of certain evidence would be unjust because man would have
no opportunity to defend himself). See also 2 G. GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 817 (C.
Lofft ed. 1795) (evidence excluded if it would surprise party).
19. E.g., Spenceley v. De Willott, 7 East 108, 110 (1806) (inconvenience of trying numerous
collateral issues); Wright v. McKee, 37 Vt. 161, 163-64 (1864) (makes trials long, tedious and
expensive); Trial of Henry Harrison, 12 Howell, St. Tr. 833, 864 (1692) (causes delay).
20. See People v. Corey, 148 N.Y. 476, 489, 42 N.E. 1066, 1071 (1896) (evidence that
defendant had syphilis would arouse jurors' passions and antipathy); People v. Dye, 75 Cal.
108, 112, 16 P. 537, 539 (1888) (evidence that defendant involved in scheme to blackmail
wife's lover should have been excluded as exposing him to jurors' contempt); R. v. Rowton,
Leigh & C. 520, 540 (1865) (trial might be overwhelmed with prejudice).
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in all of the major restatements of the rules of evidence. 21 Virtually all
modern scholarly writings accord it a place in the jurisprudence of evidence,
with only minor disagreements about how flexible it should be.2

However, neither historical practice nor general consensus necessarily
justifies the continued existence of a rule of evidence or trial procedure.?
In the 1940's, Edmund Morgan mounted a strong intellectual attack against
the concept of a prejudice rule. Morgan argued not only that the common
law cases excluding prejudicial evidence were so inconsistent that no restatement of an American prejudice rule was possible, but also that there should
be no prejudice rule. Rather, the regulation of relevant but prejudicial
evidence should be left entirely up to the trial judge. Morgan's view was
incorporated into the A.L.I. Model Code of Evidence. 24 Rule 303 provided
that trial judges could exclude prejudicial evidence in their discretion," but
that such decisions "should depend so completely upon the circumstances
of the particular case and be so entirely in the discretion of the trial judge
' 26
that a decision in one case should not be used as a precedent in another.
Morgan's position commanded widespread consensus among the evidence

scholars of that time.27 One wrote:

Attempting to control [prejudice] through resort to a pattern of [rules]
cannot allay the confusion. A trial is a swift moving thing, and the
judicial mind should not be pulled this way and that by a congeries of

21. See 1 J. WVoMoRE, EvmENcE iN TRIkLs AT COMMON LAw §§ 28, 1863, 1904 (1904)
[hereafter all references to Wigmore's treatise are to the first edition unless otherwise specified];
Ugru. R. EvrD. 403, 13 U.L.A. 151 (1953); FED. R. Evw. 403; MODEL CODE OF EViDENCE
Rule 303 (1942).
22. Some scholars appear to trust judicial neutrality and argue for a flexible rule. See J.
MAoumE, EvrmENCE: COmmON SENSE AND COmmON LAW 200 (1947) (prejudice should be

defined to help guide discretion, but must also be left flexible); C. McCoiwcK, HANDBOOK
OF Tm LAw OF EviDENcE § 152, at 320 (1954) (primarily discretion, but in some situations
discretion has hardened into rules). Others distrust the ability of trial judges to be neutral,
and argue for a more precisely defined rule. See Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A
Conflict in Theory, 5 VANm. L. Ray. 385, 393 (1952) (there must be legal standards by which
discretionary rulings can be measured to guard against whim and caprice).
23. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (calling 12-person jury an historical
accident and approving the use of smaller juries in criminal cases).
24. Morgan, The Code of Evidence Proposed by the American Law Institute, 27 A.B.A.
J. 587, 590 (1941). See also Ladd, Determinationof Relevancy, 31 TuL. L. Rnv. 81, 89 (1956)
(Dean Ladd worked with Morgan on the Advisory Committee that drafted the Model Code
of Evidence).
25. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 303 (1942).
26. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 303 comment (1942).
27. Many important evidence scholars of the mid-twentieth century were members of the
A.L.I. Advisory Committee, including Maguire, Ladd, and McCormick. MODEL CODE OF
EVmENCE iii (1942). There was little disagreement among them over Morgan's position. See
A.L.I., Minutes of Evidence Conference Held at Northeast Harbor, Maine, September 9-13,
1940 at 21 (mimeo; copy at University of Iowa College of Law library). The aging Wigmore,
chief opponent of the non-rule position, was not a member of the committee, a snub about
which he apparently was bitter. See Wigmore, The American Law Institute Code of Evidence
Rules: A Dissent, 28 A.B.A. J. 23, 23 (1942).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:831

finely spun precedents.
. [T]he fabric of law, dedicated as it is to
the adjustment of human ills and human turmoil, must never be tortured
into an . . . abstraction fathered by an ill-fitting precedent . ..
In
short, the modern trend of judicial thinking appears to have accepted
the Aristotelian concept of individualization, recognizing the inability of
human lawmakers to lay down in advance rules which will fit all
particular cases arising in the future.2

The attack on the prejudice rule was repulsed by the practicing bar. No
state enacted the Model Code of Evidence, and its spectacular failure is
often attributed to this one proposal. 29 Yet the idea of replacing the rule
with complete discretion refuses to die. Nixon's Department of Justice

revived it when the Federal Rules of Evidence were being drafted, arguing
that trial judges should not be required to exclude prejudicial evidence that
might help convict a criminal defendant. 30 A few modern appellate courts
that have encountered difficulty in articulating a useful prejudice rule suggest
that it might be preferable to leave the decision to trial judges.3 1 Even a

few evidence scholars continue to question the wisdom of having a prejudice
rule. For example, Professor Kuhns argues that there are too many varieties

of situations in which potential prejudice may occur, and too many varying
degrees of probative value and prejudicial effect, to formulate a meaningful
rule.3 2 Decisions about prejudicial impact therefore are better left to the
trial judge's discretion.
Despite these criticisms, a prejudice rule seems to deserve a place in the
jurisprudence of evidence for three reasons: 1) The absence of a rule
necessarily confers broad power on trial judges to make decisions according
to their personal biases, which will tend to result in inconsistent rulings. 2)
Conferring power on trial judges to issue rulings in the absence of standards
set by higher authority is inconsistent with the usual hierarchy of the legal
system. 3) Empirical research indicates that there is likely to be little intuitive

28. Slough, Relevancy Unraveled (pt. 1), 5 U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1956) (footnotes
omitted).
29. See Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in EVidence, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 220, 22122 (1976).
30. See 2 D. LOTISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 124, at 5-6 (1985).
31. See Dente v. Riddell, Inc., 664 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1981) (interpreting Federal Rule
403's use of word "may" as permitting trial judge to ignore the written rule and make own
decision whether to admit or exclude prejudicial evidence); Brown v. Billy Marlar Chevrolet,
Inc., 381 So. 2d 191, 193 (Ala. 1980) (leaving admissibility of prosthetic device to discretion
of trial judge); State v. Hults, 9 Wash. App. 297, 303-04, 513 P.2d 89, 93-94 (1973)
(admissibility of cumulative evidence in trial judge's discretion); Cope v. Sevigny, 289 A.2d
682, 689 (Me. 1972) (trial judge may dedide if relevance overridden by extraneous non-probative
factors).
32. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts Evidence, 66
IowA

L. FEv. 777, 804-05 (1981). Kuhns' argument is premised in part on the presupposition

that judges are reasonable persons who will reach roughly the same conclusions as jurors (and
as each other) about the degree of probative value and prejudicial effect of evidence. Id. at
778 n.4.
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agreement among trial judges concerning the prejudicial effect of various
items evidence.
If trial judges are given power to decide the admissibility of evidence,
but no rule or principle33 to guide their decisions, they will have to be
guided by their personal views. Such autonomous decisions are likely to
vary because different judges will disagree about whether particular items
of evidence are too prejudicial to be admitted. In a number of common
situations in which the current prejudice rule is invoked, and varying
decisions reached, the eventual verdict may be affected. For example:
1. Empirical research indicates that jurors are likely to return larger
verdicts for civil plaintiffs if they find out that the defendant has insurance
or other ample resources. 34 Yet some judges have permitted plaintiffs to
offer evidence of the defendant's financial resources, others have excluded
it.35
2. Research by psychologists shows that jurors' decisions in criminal cases
can be affected by their perception of the amount of suffering felt by
victims. Evidence of suffering can increase the severity of the sentence. 36
Yet, in homicide cases, some courts have allowed the state to introduce
37
evidence about the suffering felt by a victim's family, and others have not.
3. Empirical research demonstrates that expert testimony by a psychologist
on the unreliability of eyewitness identifications can affect how jurors
evaluate the evidence and increase the likelihood of an acquittal.3 1 Yet, in
criminal cases in which the primary evidence against the defendant was

33. Dworkin distinguishes between rules and principles, but points out that it is not always
clear whether a statement is a rule or a principle. R. DwoaRN, supra note 3, at 23-28. The
statement that certain evidence is prejudicial and should be excluded if that prejudice outweighs
its probative value is such an ambiguous statement possessing both rule-like and principle-like
characteristics.
34. See Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. Ray. 744, 754 (1959).
35. Compare Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 388-89, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183, 189 (1964)
(evidence concerning defendant drug company's profits admitted) with Pagel v. Yates, 128 Ill.
App. 3d 897, 902-03, 471 N.E.2d 946, 951 (1984) (evidence of defendant's wealth should be
excluded).
36. See Dane & Wrightsman, Effects of Defendants' and Victims' Characteristicson Jurors'
Verdicts, in Tan PSYC HOLOGY OF ram CoturooM 83, 99-100 (N. Kerr & R. Bray eds. 1982)
(summarizing research).
37. Compare People v. Free, 94 Ill. 2d 378, 413-15, 447 N.E.2d 218, 235-36 (victim's
husband permitted to testify about children who missed their mother), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
685 (1983) with People v. Bernette, 30 Ill. 2d 359, 371-72, 197 N.E.2d 436, 443-44 (1964)
(victim's wife not permitted to testify about young children). See also Booth v. Maryland, 107
S. Ct. 2529, 2535-36 (1987) (majority thinks expressions of grief and anger in victim impact
statement would "inflame jury and divert it from deciding the case on the relevant evidence");
id. at 2542 (White, J., dissenting) (disagreeing that such evidence is unfair or prejudicial).
38. See Wells, Lindsay & Tousignant, Effects of Expert Psychological Advice on Human
Performance in Judging the Validity of Eyewitness Testimony, 4 L. & Hum. BaHAv. 275
(1980). See also Wells, The Eyewitness, in Tan PSYCHOLOoGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRiAL PROCEDURE
43, 61-62 (S. Kassin & L. Wrightsman eds. 1985) (summarizing research).
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eyewitness identification, some judges have permitted the defense to offer
such evidence, and others have refused to allow it. 39
4. Research has confirmed that jurors are more likely to convict a person
of a crime if they find out he was guilty of similar criminal conduct. 0 Yet,
in sex crime cases, some courts have permitted the state to introduce evidence
that the defendant was previously involved in pornography, others have
excluded it.

4

1

Conferring broad power on trial judges can only increase the variation
that results from bias. Despite naive assurances from a few judges that they
can be impartial, 42 most contend that judges are not neutral. Rather, they
are influenced at least subconsciously by their ideological predispositions,
especially in criminal cases.43 Experienced observers of the courts point out
that many judges seem routinely to allow the state to introduce prejudicial
evidence against criminal defendants. 44 Anecdotal illustrations of judges
disregarding rules of evidence to the detriment of criminal defendants are
legion. 45 More systematic empirical studies also show striking ideological
patterns to judicial decisionmaking in criminal cases, confirming that political biases affect rulings. 4 The broader the power of trial judges, and the

39. Compare State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 292-97, 660 P.2d 1208, 1219-24 (1983)
(expert testimony admissible) with United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 384 (1st Cir. 1979)
(expert testimony properly excluded). Cf. State v. Rodriquez, 145 Ariz. 157, 167-68, 700 P.2d
855, 865-66 (1985) (within trial judge's discretion to exclude).
40. See Hatton, Snortum & Oskamp, The Effects of Biasing Information and Dogmatism
Upon Witness Testimony, 23 PsYclioNoMic Sci. 425 (1971) (prior record for traffic violations
and one assault conviction increased conviction rate for reckless driving). These results are
consistent with Doob & Kirschenbaum, Some EmpiricalEvidence on the Effect of s.12 of the
Canada Evidence Act Upon an Accused, 15 CiM. L.Q. 88 (1972).
41. Compare State v. Spargo, 364 N.W.2d 203, 209 (Iowa 1985) (investigator's testimony
that defendant had previously been involved in pornography was admissible) with People v.
Chandler, 65 A.D.2d 920, 921, 410 N.Y.S.2d 459, 460 (1978) (police should not be allowed
to testify about finding pornographic books in the defendant's apartment).
42. E.g., McElroy, supra note 5, at 357-58.
43. See M. FANKEL, PARTIsAN JusncE 48-49 (1980). See also R. NEELY, WHY CoURTs
DON'T WOu 10 (1983) (Chief Justice Neely of the West Virginia Supreme Court writes that
courts are not neutral; rather, judges let politics and emotion influence decisions.).
44. E.g., Graham, The Relationship Among FederalRules of Evidence 607, 801(d)(1)(A),
and 403: A Reply to Weinstein's Evidence, 55 Tax. L. REv. 573, 578 (1977).
45. E.g., Dresser v. State, 454 N.E.2d 406, 409 (Ind. 1983) (affirming judge's decision to
admit evidence that had failed the balancing test). See also Spargo, 364 N.W.2d 203 (trial
judge allowed investigator to testify to unsubstantiated charge that defendant had previously
been involved with child pornography, in violation of hearsay, personal knowledge, and
character evidence rules); State v. Lavaris, 41 Wash. App. 856, 859-60, 707 P.2d 134, 136-37
(1985) (judge permitted state to "impeach" witness in derogation of both hearsay and
impeachment rules, resulting in the jury hearing a co-defendant's accusation against the
defendant), aff'd, 106 Wash. 2d 340, 721 P.2d 515 (1986); Murdock v. State, 664 P.2d 589,
600-01 (Alaska App. 1983) (defendant's ability to impeach a key witness against him restricted
in apparent violation of Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)).
46. See Rowland, Songer & Carp, PresidentialEffects on Criminal Justice Policy in the
Lower FederalCourts: The Reagan Judges, 22 L. & Soc'Y Rnv. 191, 195-97 (1988). Much of
the earlier research is summarized in Champagne & Nagel, supra note 6.
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less they are guided by standards, the greater will be opportunities for that
bias to affect the outcome of cases.
The delegation of such a degree of autonomy to trial court judges also
is inconsistent with traditional legal theory. Allocating power to trial judges
to make decisions that can affect the outcome of cases, but providing them
with no standards by which to exercise it, is incompatible with the basic
hierarchy of the legal system. Standards and guidelines usually are set by
higher political authority-the legislature or supreme court. Trial judges
may have discretion to act, but they must make their decisions within
boundaries.4 7 Trial courts can therefore be held accountable to political
authority through the review process. 4 The absence of a prejudice rule
would leave trial judges accountable to no one.
Recent empirical research by Teitelbaum, Sutton-Barbere and Johnson 49
provides further evidence of the need for a prejudice rule. Their research
indicates that trial judges are unlikely to share a common intuitive definition
of prejudice. Using lawyers as surrogate judges, Teitelbaum and his colleagues found wide disagreement concerning the prejudicial effect of various
items of evidence, and whether they should be excluded or admitted. On
two issues that can significantly affect a jury's verdict-evidence of a civil
defendant's financial resources and a criminal defendant's record of conviction for related offenses 50-the surrogate judges showed the least agreement. 5' Without guidelines, such disagreements are likely to result in a wide
variation in rulings leading to inconsistent jury decisions.
Wigmore's solution to the problem was to draft a minutely detailed,
codified set of prejudice rules. He thought the variability in decisions could
be reduced by specifying hundreds of situations in which potentially prejudicial evidence should be excluded or admitted. He devoted over 400
sections of his treatise to explicating them.5 2 His solution was never very
practical, however. It is not realistic to think that rules can be drafted
telling a trial judge whether to exclude such evidence as a drug defendant's
diary entry which reads "Coast Guard at our Stern. Goodbye to my
dreams[,]" 53 statistics showing that children are often molested by relatives

47. See R. DwolKN, supra note 3, at 31-39.
48. See Christie, supra note 3, at 747-57.
49. Supra note 4, at 1163-73.
50. See supra notes 34 & 40 and accompanying text.
51. Teitelbaum, Sutton-Barbere & Johnson, supra note 4, at 1201 (Table 2).
52. 1 & 2 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLo-AMIERiCAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TxR.4s AT COMMON LAW §§ 24-465 (3d ed. 1940). Wigmore argued that no simple definition
such as that contained in the ALI Model Rules was adequate, but that most of his individual
rules should be included in any codification. CODE OF EVDENCE 11-14 comment by Wigmore
(Preliminary draft no. 10, 1940).

53. United States v. Mehtala, 578 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1978).
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and delay reporting it, 54 a homicide victim's wedding photograph showing
her wedding ring used to identify the decomposed body, 5 or a rape
defendant's offer to expose his penis to the jury so they could see that a
56
prior injury had left him incapacitated.
Contemporary scholars would undoubtedly concede the impossibility of
limiting prejudicial evidence through a series of precisely drafted rules. Yet,
having no rule appears equally unacceptable. A better approach is to
articulate a set of principles to explain when relevant evidence should be
excluded as prejudicial. This approach requires both a definition of prejudice
consistent with a coherent theory of proper trial practice, and a procedural
7
mechanism for making decisions in close cases.1
II.

THm MEAMNG OF PREJUDICE

No agreement exists on the proper definition of prejudice. Courts and
commentators appear to label evidence prejudicial for five different reasons:
1) unnecessarily arousing emotions, 2) interfering with rational truth-seeking,
usually by confusing or misleading jurors, 3) upsetting the normal balance
of the adversary system, by surprising the opponent, or interfering with
jury impartiality, 4) being inefficient through wasting time, presenting
repetitive or cumulative evidence, or otherwise delaying the trial, and 5)
symbolically undermining important political interests of the state. Each of
these proposed meanings has its adherents and detractors.
A.

Arousing Emotion

Prejudice commonly is equated with the tendency of evidence to arouse
strong emotions in jurors. Emotional arousal is mentioned by Professor
Green as the primary evil to be prevented by the prejudice rule,", and by
Weinstein and Berger as one of several important definitions.5 9 Wigmore
argues that emotions cause prejudice because they mislead jurors into making
hasty decisions based on passion instead of slowly evaluating all the evidenceA° Many appellate courts also label as prejudicial evidence that arouses

54. State v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 575-76, 683 P.2d 173, 180 (1984), modified, State
v. Kitchen, 110 Wash. 2d 403, 756 P.2d 105 (1988).
55. State v. Hutchinson, 99 N.M. 616, 624-25, 661 P.2d 1315, 1323-24 (1983).
56. Garvik v. Burlington, C.R. & N. Ry., 124 Iowa 691, 694-95, 100 N.W. 498, 500

(1904).

57. E.g., Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly
PrejudicialEvidence, 58 WASH. L. REv. 497, 498-503 (1983).
58. Green, Relevancy and Its Limits, 1969 LAW & Soc. ORD. 533, 543.
59. J. Wa mN & M. BERGER, WENsmN's EvmNCE, 403[01], 403[03] (1988).
60. See J. WIGMORE, supra note 21, §§ 21, 28, 1904.
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emotions, is likely to "inflame" the minds of the jurors, 6 creates sympathy
for a party, 62 a crime victim, 63 or the victim's family,64 or stimulates feelings
of antipathy, abhorrence, or distrust.65
The prevailing view, however, is that emotional arousal by itself is not a
sufficient condition to constitute prejudice. Only if emotion causes jurors
to misevaluate or ignore evidence is it prejudicial. The danger is not
emotionalism per se, but that jurors might incorrectly decide a case if they
vote with their hearts rather than their heads. 6 Courts fear that strong
emotions will incite jurors into making irrational decisions, 67 misusing,
exaggerating, or ignoring evidence, 6 or disregarding their instructions on
the law.6 9
Emotional arousal may not even be a necessary condition to constitute
prejudice. The drafters of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 wrote that prejudice
means "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis,
commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one," claiming "ample
support in the authorities" for the proposition.70 Professor Lempert points

61. E.g., Meanes v. State, 668 S.W.2d 366, 374 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en band) (whether
victim's bloody shirt would inflame jury), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 945 (1984); Iverson v.
McDonnell, 36 Wash. 73, 74-75, 78 P. 202, 203 (1904) (evidence of insurance would inflame
minds of jury).
62. See Brown v. Billy Marlar Chevrolet, Inc., 381 So. 2d 191, 193 (Ala. 1980) (showing
jury how artificial leg functioned would arouse sympathy for plaintiff); State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 51 Ala. App. 426, 432, 286 So. 2d 302, 307 (1973) (proving insurance
company had already paid uninsured motorist benefits would arouse sympathy for defendant).
63. See State v. Bott, 310 Minn. 331, 337-38, 246 N.W.2d 48, 53 (1976) (whether victim
could exhibit scars turned on whether evidence would arouse passions).
64. E.g., Elizondo v. State, 130 Tex. Crim. 393, 395-96, 94 S.W.2d 457, 458 (1936)
(sympathy for surviving wife and children of homicide victim).
65. E.g., State v. Martin, 472 So. 2d 91, 96 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (arouse hostility against
defendant); McCormack v. Riley, 576 S.W.2d 358, 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978) (hostility against
party); People v. Bernette, 30 Ill. 2d 359, 371-72, 197 N.E.2d 436, 443-44 (1964) (evidence
about victim's children inadmissible because it would arouse anger, hate and passion in jurors).
66. See FED. R. Evm. 403 advisory committee's note.
67. See United States v. Astling, 733 F.2d 1446, 1457 (11th Cir. 1984) (incite jury to an
irrational decision); Shamburger v. Behrens, 380 N.W.2d 659, 661 (S.D. 1986) (decide case on
improper basis); Patricia R. v. Sullivan, 631 P.2d 91, 96 (Alaska 1981) (decide against plaintiff
based on her low social status).
68. See Zamora v. State, 361 So. 2d 776, 783 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (emotional
evidence might distract jury from fair consideration of evidence); State v. Bowden, 113 R.I.
649, 659-60, 324 A.2d 631, 637 (1974) (evidence arousing passions of jury excludable if it
tends to influence the outcome of the case), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1109 (1975); State v.
Germain, 433 So. 2d 110, 119 (La. 1983) (strong emotional reaction could overwhelm jurors
and cause them to lose sight of the need for the state to furnish evidence of guilt).
69. See State v. Couture, 146 Vt. 268, 277, 502 A.2d 846, 852 (1985) (inflamed jurors,
causing confusion of issue whether conviction related only to credibility or related to substantive
issues); People v. Free, 94 Ill. 2d 378, 415, 447 N.E.2d 218, 236 (exclusion depends on whether
emotional evidence causes jury erroneously to believe certain issue material), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 865 (1983).
70. FED. R. Evro. 403 advisory committee's note (emphasis added). This comment is
frequently quoted by appellate courts.
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out that more subtle psychological reactions also can cause jurors to lose
the ability to process information rationally. Evidence that dovetails with
jurors' biases and stereotypes, or that reduces their regret at reaching a
wrong decision, may improperly influence verdicts exactly as strong emotions
would. For example, finding out that a defendant is covered by insurance
is hardly likely to arouse strong emotions, yet it may cause jurors to return
a large verdict for a plaintiff despite weak evidence. Lempert therefore
would define prejudice as any characteristic of an item of evidence, including
its emotional impact, likely to affect the jurors' states of mind and induce
"estimation" problems. 7'
Professor Gold goes even further, arguing that emotion should not be
included as any part of the definition of prejudice. Lawsuits are inherently
emotional. In order for jurors to fully understand a case, Gold asserts, they
must understand both the facts and the emotional reactions of the participants. To equate prejudice with emotional arousal, and exclude emotional
evidence, is to present jurors with an unreal picture of the case which will
hinder rather than promote fully informed decisions. Gold argues that the
definition of prejudice must therefore recognize a legitimate role for emo72
tionalism, not try to prevent it all.
Professor Gold is obviously right to some extent, but there must be
limits. Just because trials are inherently emotional should not give license
to the parties to offer all manner of scurrilous evidence. At other phases
of trial, only a limited range of emotional arousal is considered acceptable.
For example, during closing argument, parties are permitted to display
emotional reactions to their cases7" and to emphasize the evidence that has
particular emotional impact. 74 However, they are prohibited from appealing
to emotions that are not related to the evidence, such as by suggesting that
a large verdict will impact on the jurors' own insurance rates. 7" Nor may
attorneys suggest that emotion be substituted in place of evidence as a basis
for decision, such as by arguing that the jurors should base a verdict on

71. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 Micr.

L. REv. 1021, 1030, 1036 (1977). In psycho-

logical terms, this theory is that evidence is prejudicial if it is likely to induce juror decisionmaking through heuristics (short cuts based on stereotypical assumptions). See Saks & Kidd,
Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REv.
123 (1980).
72. Gold, supra note 57, at 503-10. See also Gold, supra note 10 (making similar argument);
Gold, Covert Advocacy: Reflections on the Use of PsychologicalPersuasion Techniques in the
Courtroom, 65 N.C.L. Rav. 481, 498-502 (1987) (emotionalism is an important and desirable
part of the trial process).
73. See Ferguson v. Moore, 98 Tenn. 342, 351-52, 39 S.W. 341, 343 (1897) (legitimate for
attorney to shed tears during argument).
74. E.g., State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 101-08, 449 A.2d 1280, 1291-92 (1982) (racial motive
for killing); Southern Ry. v. Jarvis, 266 Ala. 440, 445, 97 So. 2d 549, 553 (1957) (emphasizing
tragedy of loss of a young life).
75. E.g., Finney v. G.C. Murphy Co., 400 Pa. 46, 50, 161 A.2d 385, 387 (1960).
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racial or 77
religious grounds, 76 or use their verdict to deter other would-be
criminals .
This distinction between emotions inherent in the nature of the dispute
and unrelated emotions also is found in evidence cases. As a general rule,
only evidence likely to arouse emotions not directly connected to the dispute
is excluded. Courts do not consider evidence unfairly prejudicial just because
it stirs the sensibilities of the jurors, arouses feelings of horror, indignation,
sympathy or antipathy, 7s or is disgusting or indecent.7 9 For example, gruesome photographs of murder victims, however horrible, are admissible as
long as they accurately show the condition of the body at a time relevant
to the case-death, discovery of the body, or autopsy. Their emotional
impact is considered inherent in the nature of the case and not prejudicial. 0
However, a photograph of the victim at some other time-for example,
showing what she looked like in her coffin-is likely to be labelled prejudicial, even though its actual impact may be less."'
Similarly, not all evidence connecting a person to illegal drugs is prejudicial. If a person involved in a crime took drugs just before the crime,
talked about drugs during it, or was carrying drugs when he was arrested,
evidence of his drug use is part of the events surrounding the crime, and

not prejudicial.12 However, evidence of drug use at a time not connected
to the basic event being litigated is likely to be excluded.83
76. E.g., State v. Wilson, 404 So. 2d 968, 970 (La. 1981) (racial prejudice); McWilliams
v. Sentinel Pub. Co., 339 Ill. App. 2d 83, 103-04, 89 N.E.2d 266, 277 (1949) (religious
prejudice).
77. E.g., Hines v. State, 425 So. 2d 589, 591 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (send message to
criminals); Commonwealth v. Long, 258 Pa. Super. 312, 318, 392 A.2d 810, 813 (1978) (fight
crime in subways).
78. E.g., Burnett v. Caho, 7 Ill. App. 3d 266, 272, 285 N.E.2d 619, 624 (1972) (just
because evidence stirs sensibilities of jurors is no reason to exclude it); Darling v. Charleston
Community Memorial Hosp., 50 Ill. App. 2d 253, 320-23, 200 N.E.2d 149, 183 (1964)
(competent evidence may not be excluded merely because it might arouse feelings of horror
or indignation in the jury), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
79. E.g., Dunkin v. City of Hoquiam, 56 Wash. 47, 48, 105 P. 149, 151 (1909) (injury to
anus, wound may be exhibited to jury).
80. E.g., People v. Poster, 76 Ill. 2d 365, 375-76, 392 N.E.2d 6, 10 (1979) (photos of
decaying dismembered body not prejudicial); Zamora, 361 So. 2d at 783 (photo of decomposing
corpse not prejudicial). See also Reimer v. State, 657 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983)
(in eleven years, no case reversed because of introduction of photographs of crime scene and
body of victim); J. TArFORD & R. QuINLAN, INDIANA TRIAL EVIDENCE MANUAL § 48.5 (2d ed.
1987) (no case in 25 years disapproved admitting photographs of crime victim).
81. E.g., Eddy v. State, 496 N.E.2d 24, 26 (Ind. 1986) (suggesting that photographs of
the corpse in its coffin not admissible).
82. E.g., United States v. Lawson, 780 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1985) (cocaine found in hotel
at time of arrest not prejudicial); United States v. Evans, 697 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1983) (evidence
of drug deal offered to connect defendant to alleged co-conspirator and refute defendant's
explanation that he went to St. Louis on vacation, necessary to complete telling of story, not
prejudicial).
83. E.g., People v. Grisham, 125 Mich. App. 280, 285-86, 335 N.W.2d 680, 683 (1983)
(evidence of defendant's unrelated alcohol abuse prejudicial); State v. Beachrnan, 189 Mont.
400, 616 P.2d 337 (1980) (evidence that prosecutor smoked marijuana with defendant, offered
to explain why defendant went into hiding, excluded as prejudicial).
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Thus, it is not helpful to define prejudice as arousing emotions. Too
many courts routinely approve the admissibility of highly emotional evidence. Such a definition also would be inconsistent with the courts' recog-

nition during other parts of the trial that a certain amount of emotionalism
is inevitable. Instead, the definition of prejudice should help judges distinguish between permissible and impermissible emotionalism. One logical way
of attempting this task is to more specifically articulate the functions,

values, and social objectives served by trials, and label as prejudicial evidence
incompatible with them.
B.

Interfering With Verdict Accuracy: Confusing Issues and
Misleading Jurors

The second common meaning given to prejudice is interference with the
truth-seeking process. Evidence is said to be prejudicial if it confuses the

issues,8 4 confuses or misleads the jury,8 5 diverts or distracts the jury from
the facts 6 or causes the jurors to make inferential errors. s7 In this category,
courts tend to include both the risk of jurors making factual mistakes and
the danger jurors will not apply the proper legal standards for determining

responsibility.
The most commonly expressed fear is that certain evidence will not
advance informed, factual decisionmaking, but will produce side-effects that
cause the jury to make factual errors. Prejudice is said to occur when jurors
draw unwarranted inferences from evidence, 8 ignore undisputed facts,8 9
overlook gaps in one side's case,1° or otherwise become unable to keep the

84. J. WIGMORE, supra note 21, §§ 28, 1863, 1904; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 303
(1942); FED. R. Evm. 403. See also Gould v. Bebee, 134 La. 123, 128, 63 So. 848, 850 (1913)
(citing Wigmore and Greenleaf).
85. J. THAYER, supra note 15, at 516; MODEL CODE OF EVmENCE Rule 303 (1942); FED.
R. Evm. 403. See also State v. Lapan, 101 Vt. 124, 139-40, 141 A. 686, 693 (1928) (evidence
inadmissable because it would confuse jurors and divert them from real issues).
86. Evans, 697 F.2d at 249 (prejudice equated with diverting jury from issues); Zamora,
361 So. 2d at 783 (evidence might distract jury from fair consideration of evidence); State v.
Titworth, 255 N.W.2d 241, 246 (Minn. 1977) (evidence might divert jury from facts of crime
charged).
87. Gold, supra note 57, at 506.
88. E.g., State v. Reingold, 49 Or. App. 781, 783-85, 620 P.2d 964, 965-66 (1980) (defendant
charged with receiving stolen property; bringing seller of stolen goods into court in prison
garb might cause jurors to assume defendant could likewise have easily identified him as a
thief), petition for review denied, 52 Or. App. 117, 631 P.2d 340 (1981). See Gold, supra note
57, at 506-07.
89. E.g., Pagel v. Yates, 128 Ill. App. 3d 897, 902, 471 N.E.2d 946, 951 (1984) (evidence
of relative wealth of parties will cause jurors to decide case based on who can afford to bear
the loss, diverting them from central evidence of liability).
90. E.g., Germain, 433 So. 2d at 119 (causes jurors to lose sight of state's need to furnish
proof, may overlook gaps in case).
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evidence in its proper perspective. 91 For example, in Roberts v. State,9 a
defendant was charged with committing arson for the insurance proceeds.
Evidence of several past fires in houses owned by him was offered to show
that the defendant had experience with and knowledge about how fire
insurance worked. It was excluded. The court feared that jurors would
overlook the fact that there was no evidence that the defendant deliberately
set any of the prior fires, infer that he probably set all of them, infer a
propensity to arson, and conclude that he was probably guilty of the crime
charged. 9 In other words, jurors might not base their verdict on the weight
of the relevant evidence, but on a distorted or abbreviated view of what
happened that is disproportionately influenced by the prejudicial evidence.
In extreme cases, the jury may reach a factually incorrect verdict, convicting
made for excluding
an innocent person. This is the standard argument
94
evidence of prior criminal or immoral activity.
However, defining prejudice as interfering with truth-determination and
causing factual errors is problematic. Assume a defendant claims to be
innocent of a crime for which he is on trial. Among the evidence against
him is the testimony of an elderly woman that she saw him near the scene
moments after the crime. Suppose the defense attorney seeks to elicit
evidence that the woman has ppor eyesight and needs thick glasses in order
to see. 95 In addition, the defense offers expert evidence from a psychologist
on the general unreliability of eyewitness identifications made by strangers.
To both offers, the prosecutor objects that the evidence is prejudicial because
it is likely to lead the jury into erroneously inferring that this particular
witness was mistaken, 96 an inference that ultimately could cause the jury to
acquit a guilty man. In order for the judge to evaluate whether the evidence
will mislead the jury concerning what happened, the judge must know what

91. E.g., United States v. Bailleaux, 685 F.2d 1105, 1109 (9th Cir. 1982) (courts must
guard against possibility that jurors will base their decision to convict on evidence of a
defendant's prior record rather than on evidence of whether he committed the crime charged);
Weiby v. Wente, 264 N.W.2d 624, 628 (Minn. 1978) (testimony by physicians as to the onset
of a disease logically relevant to prove when it should have been detectable but outweighed
by danger that jury would be confused and misled). See Lempert, supra note 71, at 1030-31
(calling this an estimation problem).
92. 163 Ga. App. 92, 293 S.E.2d 40, rev'd, 250 Ga. 414, 297 S.E.2d 274 (1982).
93. Id. at 93-94, 293 S.E.2d at 41-42.
94. See Beaver & Marques, A Proposal to Modify the Rule on Criminal Conviction
Impeachment, 58 TaEMLE L.Q. 585, 601-06 (1985) (also summarizing, but exaggerating, some
empirical support for the proposition); Dolan, supra note 29, at 226; Gold, supra note 57, at
505; Lempert, supra note 71, at 1036-39.
95. This is a variation of Monroe Freedman's famous ethical hypothetical in Freedman,
ProfessionalResponsibility of the CriminalDefense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64
MicH. L. R~a.

1469, 1474-75 (1966).

96. See United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979) (excluding expert
testimony on unreliability of eyewitness testimony because of its potential for confusion).
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really happened. Obviously, the judge cannot know whether the defendant
committed the crime or is the victim of mistaken identity.
The factual-error approach to defining prejudice also is inconsistent
with the general theory of trials. Although a few writers have suggested
that one of the purposes of trials is to reveal the objective, historical
truth of what happened, 97 most scholars reject this position. 9 In the first
place, the fallible nature of human perception and memory make accurate
reconstruction of past events unlikely. 99 Therefore, the best result that

can be hoped for is an approximation of historical truth. Second, even
this approximate truth must be reconstructed according to rules of
evidence and procedure that often frustrate truth-seeking, e.g., by excluding illegally seized evidence. 00 Trials appear less concerned with

truth than with proof-whether the parties can satisfy the rules of a
closed system.' 0' Third, the paradigm thst a single picture of what

happened will emerge from the evidence is not very helpful in describing
the typical trial. In most cases, the plaintiff's and defendant's versions
of events will differ substantially. In many cases, the jury would be
equally justified in reaching any one of several verdicts. Whatever verdict
it reaches will be acceptable to the appellate courts, as long as it is
2
supported by some of the evidence. 0
But the jury's verdict task is not accurately described even as approximating the truth based on whatever proof has been offered. A factual
decision about what probably happened is rarely a sufficient basis for a
verdict. Most kinds of civil and criminal liability depend on the defendant's

97. See Gerber, Victory vs. Truth: The Adversary System and its Ethics, 19 A~iz. ST. L.J.
3 (1987); Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in the
Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1986); Meese, Promoting Truth in the
Courtroom, 40 VAND. L. REv. 271, 271-72 (1987).
98. E.g., J. TArsoPD, TaE TRAL PRocESS: LAW, TACTICS AND Ermcs 5-6 (1983); Good-

paster, On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J. CRm. L. & CRMINOLOGY
118, 121-24 (1987).
99. See Markus, A Theory of Trial Advocacy, 56 TuLANE L. REv. 95, 96 (1981). See
generally E. LoFrus, EYEwnwEss TEsT rmoNy 20-87 (1979) and J. TANPORD, supra note 98, at
23-24 (both summarizing psychological literature on intrinsic problems of perception, memory,
and recall).
100. See Loh, The Evidence and Trial Procedure, in THE PSYCHOLOGY oF EVIDENCE AND
TRIAL PROCEDURE 16-18 (S. Kassin & L. Wrightsman eds. 1985). See also Leonard, supra note
97, at 25-31 (analyzing rules of character evidence and concluding they do not advance truth
determination).
101. See A. Yarmolinsky, Misuses of Applied Social Research, in THE UsE/NoNusE/MisusE
OF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE COURTS 44, 45 (M. Saks & C. Baron eds. 1980)
(distinguishing a trial from the scientific search for an answer that does not exclude any data).
102. See Brilmayer, Wobble, or the Death of Error, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 363, 375 (1986)
(concluding from an examination of how appellate courts review verdicts that overall the law
shows little interest in whether the result was correct, only whether procedures have been
followed).
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mental state. 03 Also, the jury is expected to apply the facts to the law in

a particular manner according to a complicated set of legal instructions.
Prejudice occurs if jurors make legal mistakes and do not determine liability
according to their instructions.
Courts have justified excluding evidence accordingly, because of the
dangers that it will cause jurors to overemphasize minor issues, 104 ignore
important issues, 05 or otherwise fall to abide by specific instructions.""0 For
example, evidence of a defendant's wealth or insurance may cause a jury
to ignore the central issue of legal liability, and award damages based on
the defendant's ability to pay and the plaintiff's need.107 If jurors correctly
determine that the plaintiff has a weak case on the facts, but award a

verdict anyway because the defendant can afford it, the error is legal, not
factual. Other evidence, especially evidence offered for a limited purpose,
may be used by the jury in ways contrary to law. For example, the hearsay
rule prohibits accusatory statements of bystanders from being considered as
evidence of guilt, but permits them to be admitted to show why the police
investigated the defendant. 08 If jurors violate the limiting instruction and

consider the evidence substantively, they have again made a legal error, not
a factual one.
A better definition of prejudice therefore would be interference with the
goal of legally accurate decisionmaking.109 If evidence will tend to confuse
the jurors as to the important legal issues, cause them to ignore issues, fail
to abide by jury instructions, or otherwise apply the facts to an erroneous

103. Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger
Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEo. L.J. 185, 197-99 (1983).
104. E.g., State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 606-07, 645 P.2d 1330, 1337 (1982) (admission of
testimony may detract from principal issues by creating a "battle of the experts"); Gould, 134
La. 123, 63 So. 848 (evidence of good character likely to be overemphasized by jurors and
therefore mislead them).
105. E.g., McCormack v. Riley, 576 S.W.2d 358, 361 (Tenn. Ct, App, 1978) (most Important
definition of prejudice is distracting the jury from the main issue).
106. E.g., Weiby, 264 N.W.2d at 628 (malpractice case alleging failure to diagnose; expert
opinion about onset of disease might be used by jury as evidence of when physician of
ordinary competence should have diagnosed it).
107. See Pagel, 128 Ill. App. 3d at 902, 471 N.E.2d at 951 (jury will tend to favor those
least able to bear loss even if their evidence is weak); Iverson v. McDonnell, 36 Wash. 73,
74-75, 78 P. 202, 203 (1904) (evidence of insurance will confuse jurors about proper basis for
deciding case).
108. See Torres v. State, 442 N.E.2d 1021 (Ind. 1982) (statements made to police that a
certain person committed crime, offered into evidence not for their truth but to show knowledge
of police officer upon which he based his investigation, would be prejudicial if jury likely to
use them as independent evidence of defendant's guilt). See also Couture, 146 Vt, at 276, 502
A.2d at 852 (evidence of prior conviction prejudicial because jury likely to think it bore on
substantive issues).
109. E.g., Satzburg, A Special Aspect of Relevance: Countering Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66 CALi. L. REv. 1011, 1015 (1978).
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construction of the law, prejudice occurs." 0 A few commentators have even
suggested that this is the only legitimate meaning of prejudice, arguing that

the only principle by which trials should be guided is the need to reach an
accurate verdict."' Wigmore, for example, rationalized several ways in which
courts used the concept of prejudice, including emotional arousal, factual
error, and legal confusion, as all deriving from the tendency to "divert the

jury from a clear study of the exact purport and effect of the evidence,
and thus to obscure and suppress the truth rather than to reveal it. ' 'II2 As
the following sections will demonstrate, however, limiting the definition of
prejudice to this one concept would leave too many cases unaccounted for,

and be inconsistent with a comprehensive theory of the functions of trials.
C.

Surprise and Other Harms to the Parties' Adversarial Interests

In Rookwood's trial in 1696, the argument was made that evidence which
unfairly surprised one of the parties was prejudicial and should be ex-

cluded.1"3 Since that time, the relationship between surprise and prejudice
has been a matter of disagreement. Greenleaf included surprise as a ground
for excluding prejudicial evidence in his 1844 treatise,11 4 but neither Jones'"
nor Thayer" 6 mentioned it in treatises written fifty years later. In the first
half of the twentieth century unfair surprise was revived as one of the

meanings of prejudice. Wigmore included it in the 1940 edition of his
treatise.1" 7 Morgan and the ALI Advisory Committee included surprise in
the 1942 Model Code of Evidence,"' and this definition was carried over

110. See J. THAYER, supra note 15, at 516; 1 J. WENsTEN & M. BEROER, supra note 59,
403[04]; Kuhns, supra note 32, at 777-78.
111. See J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRiAL (1949) (general critique of trial procedure); Gerber,
supra note 97; Meese, supra note 97, at 271-72, 280; Pound, The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 404-07 (1906).
112. 1 J. WIoMoRE, supra note 21, § 1863; 1 J. WIOMORE, supra note 52, §§ 1864, 1904.
113. Trial of Ambrose Rookwood, 13 Howell, St. Tr. 139, 210 (1696) (man would have no
opportunity to defend himself). Other early cases equating prejudice with surprise include:
Trial of Christopher Layer, 16 Howell, St. Tr. 93, 246, 256 (1722); Trial of John Hampden,
9 Howell, St. Tr. 1053, 1103 (1684).
114. 1 S.GREENLEAF, A

TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

§ 52 (2d ed. 1844) (exclusion

required if the adverse party, having had no notice of such a course in evidence, is not
prepared to rebut it).
115. B. JoNs, Tim LAw OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES §§ 136-37 (2d ed. 1908).
116. J.THAYER, supra note 15, at 266, 516-18. See also Thayer, Presumptionsand the Law
of Evidence, 3 HAgv. L. REv. 141, 145 (1889) (listing four reasons for excluding relevant
evidence; surprise not among them).
117. 1 J. WIGMoRE, supra note 52, § 29a (exclude evidence if the opponent would be
unprepared to rebut surprise false evidence); id. § 194 (prior bad acts of witnesses excluded
on ground of unfair surprise); id. § 979 (extrinsic evidence to prove misconduct excluded on
ground of unfair surprise); id. § 1845 (evidence not disclosed in discovery may be inadmissible
because of unfair surprise). But see id. § 1849 (circumstantially relevant evidence may not be
excluded because of surprise).
118. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE Rule 303 (1942) (would unfairly surprise a party who has
not had reasonable ground to anticipate that such evidence would be offered).
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to the 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence.119 However, when modern rules of
discovery provided an alternative way to alleviate the problem of trial by
ambush, surprise fell into intellectual disfavor once again. The drafters of
the Federal Rules of Evidence explicitly rejected surprise as one of the
definitions of prejudice.12°
Nevertheless, the notion that surprise to the opponent may justify excluding evidence refuses to die. It is still mentioned in dictum as ground
for exclusion in the common law decisions of some states.' 2' The most
recent edition of McCormick's hornbook criticizes using surprise as a reason
to exclude evidence, but also points out that there still are occasions where
it is used, such as when the surprise results from a breach of discovery
rules. 12 If one party evades a discovery request and then tries to offer the
withheld evidence at trial, courts are still likely to exclude it. '3
Most scholars, however, would argue that excluding surprise evidence,
even for violation of discovery rules, is not justified.'m Depriving the jury
of information because of the proponent's trickery does not necessarily
advance the trial's truth-seeking function. If the surprise evidence were false
or misleading, granting a continuance would satisfy this objective just as
well as exclusion, because it would give the opponent an opportunity to
gather the necessary counter-evidence. If the surprise evidence were reliable,
granting a continuance is preferable to exclusion because it maximizes the
amount of reliable information on which the jury can base its verdict.
Therefore, it is argued, not even surprise based on deliberate violation of
12
discovery rules should be considered prejudicial. 5
This argument is based on a dubious premise. It envisions evidence law
as driven by only a single dominant principle: The rules should facilitate
accurate decisionmaking. This vision of evidence is inconsistent with the

119. UtE. R. EvE). 45 (1953) (would unfairly surprise a party who has not had reasonable
ground to anticipate that such evidence would be offered). Similarities between the Model
Code and Uniform Rules are not surprising. The Model Code was explicitly used as the basis
for the Uniform Rules, Dean Ladd and Professor McCormick served on both drafting
committees, and the Uniform Rules Committee "had established the practice of submitting its
drafts of material to Professor Morgan [who] . . . had been chairman of the original [ALI]
committee." Ucw. R. Evm. at 4 (1953). See also Trautman, supra note 22, at 392 (listing
surprise as one of the grounds for excluding relevant evidence).
120. FED. R. Evm. 403 advisory committee's note (rule does not include surprise as a
ground for exclusion; granting continuance more appropriate remedy than exclusion). Interestingly, the Committee cited Wigmore for support, although he had conceded that surprise
could be a ground for exclusion. See supra note 117.
121. E.g., Martin, 472 So. 2d at 96 (summary of state prejudice rule continues to include
surprise as ground for exclusion).
122. McCoIUscK ON EVMENcE § 185 n.27 (E. Cleary ed.) (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited
as McCoRMtCK ON EVIDENCE].
123. E.g., Murray v. State, 479 N.E.2d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 1985) (court may prohibit witness
from testifying whose name was withheld from witness list in bad faith).
124. E.g., Dolan, supra note 29, at 243-44.
125. See FED. R. Evi'. 403 advisory committee's note (continuance preferred remedy).
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general theory of American litigation. That theory holds that trials are
shaped by at least two competing principles: verdict accuracy and adversariness. The more fundamental characteristic of our trial system is in fact its
adversarial structure, not its commitment to accurate results. 26 Even the
most vocal critics of the "sporting" theory of justice concede that adversariness is the dominant feature of trials in the United States. 27 It is
unlikely, therefore, that a description of the prejudice rule which fails to
recognize the importance of adversariness will be very helpful.
Withholding evidence in violation of discovery rules, and then attempting
to introduce it, is contrary to fundamental notions of fair play inherent in
the adversary system. The principle that trials are adversarial does not mean
that they are unstructured. Like boxing or baseball, trials are contests played
according to elaborate rules. Those rules are designed to assure each litigant
a fair chance before an impartial decision-maker, and the parties are
expected to play by those rules. 28 Discovery is an important part of the
modern rules designed to keep trials fair by controlling, at least to some
extent, the natural tendency of lawyers to try to win at any cost. 2 9 Therefore,
including at least this narrow use of surprise in the definition of prejudice
is consistent with, not in conflict with, the discovery rules. Both derive
from fundamental expectations about the adversary system.
Indeed, the centrality of adversariness suggests that surprise is too narrow
a definition of this facet of prejudice. The discovery rules are not the only
ones designed to curb overzealous parties. The rules of ethics and the
constitutional constraints on police conduct serve a similar purpose. 30 It
may be that evidence obtained in violation of any of these rules governing
fair play should be considered prejudicial.
There is substantial case support for the proposition that prejudice can
mean harm to the parties' interests in a fair adversarial process conducted
according to the rules. Appellate courts suggest that judges' rulings should
facilitate both sides' opportunities to present and respond to evidence,
preserve the impartiality of the jury so that the opportunity to present a
case is meaningful, and guard against either side being given an advantage

126. E.g., S. LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARLAL JUsTiCE: TuE AMmCAN APPROACH TO
LMGAToN 1-5 (1988); Fuller & Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint
Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160-61, 1216-17 (1958).
127. E.g., M. FRANKEL, supra note 43, at 11-12; Pound, supra note 111, at 404-07.
128. E.g., Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary System, 44
OoO ST. L.J. 713, 713-17 (1983) (adversary system characterized by impartial decisionmaker,
party presentation of evidence, and elaborate set of rules to keep contests fair and reduce
judicial arbitrariness). See also MCCORMCK ON EVIDENCE § 184 (evidence law premised on
truth and party control over presentation).
129. See S. LA Nsm"A, supra note 126, at 4-5.
130. Id.
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or handicap apart from the natural strengths and weaknesses of its case.,',
For example, courts often justify excluding evidence of the bad character
of or prior misconduct by a party out of fear that it would give the
proponent an unfair competitive advantage by placing a civil party,3 2
criminal defendant,' 33 or the government' 34 in a bad light. Other courts
exclude highly emotional evidence on the same basis-if jurors become
strongly aroused for or against a party, they may lose their impartiality, or
discount a party's evidence a priori because it comes from a tainted source.' 35
Such a situation is incompatible with the fundamental premise of the
adversary system that each litigant will receive a fair hearing. Therefore,
evidence that threatens to harm a party's adversarial interest should also be
considered prejudicial.
D.

Inefficiency: Wasting Time, Repetitive Evidence, and Delay

Prejudice also is equated with wasting time. Concerns about inefficiency
and practical inconvenience are among the oldest reasons evidence is excluded as prejudicial. As early as the seventeenth century, judges debated
whether some kinds of evidence, such as character evidence, might have
too little relevance to be worth the risk of causing lengthy delay.' 36 In the
late nineteenth century, Thayer asserted that courts limited evidence to avoid
delay and tediousness, if the evidence would "take too much time in the
37
presenting of it, in view of other practicable ways of handling the case."'
In this century, waste of time has been included as a definition of prejudice
in all three major attempts to codify American evidence law,' and is
131. E.g., Bailleaux, 685 F.2d at 1111 ("Unfair prejudice results from [evidence] which
makes conviction more likely because it provokes an emotional response in the jury or otherwise
tends to affect adversely the jury's attitude toward the defendant wholly apart from its
judgment as to his guilt or innocence of the crime charged.") (emphasis in original).
132. E.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours v. Berkeley & Co., 620 F.2d 1247 (8th Cir. 1980) (prior
attempts to gain unfair competitive advantages); Baker Pool Co. v. Bennett, 411 S.W.2d 335
(Ky. 1967) (prior shoddy business practices on unrelated transactions).
133. E.g., United States v. Margiotta, 662 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1981) (prior scheme to extort
contributions to state Republican party), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983).
134. E.g., United States v. Milstead, 671 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1982) (an informant's prior
acts of cooperation with the government suggesting a pattern of use of informants).
135. E.g., Zamora, 361 So. 2d at 783 (prejudice occurs when evidence arouses emotions
which distract the jury from impartially considering the evidence).
136. See Trial of Henry Harrison, 12 Howell, St. Tr. 833, 864 (1692) (excluding evidence
that would cause delay); Trial of Thomas White, alias Whitebread, 7 Howell, St. Tr. 311, 374
(1679) (similar).
137. J. THAYER, supra note 15, at 517-18. See also Reeve v. Dennett, 145 Mass. 23, 28, 11
N.E. 938, 943 (1887) (Holmes, J.) (excluding endlessly cumulative evidence for the sake of
operating courts with some degree of efficiency was a "concession to the shortness of life").
But see 4 J. Bm.THA, RATIONALE OF JUDIciAL EVIDENCE 552-54 (1827) (delay is ground for
exclusion because it prejudices the other party, efficiency for its own sake not a valid goal).
138. MODEL CODE OF EviDENCE Rule 303 (1942) ("undue consumption of time"); Unr. R.
Evm. 403, 13 U.L.A. 151 (1953) ("undue consumption of time"); FED. R. EvrD. 403 ("undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence").
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particularly emphasized in the Federal Rules of Evidence. 3 9 Contemporary

writings routinely include the achievement of an economical and efficient
process as one of the major goals of the trial system.'"• Inefficiency
is
"
"
141
therefore usually included among the legitimate meanings of prejudice.
However, amid this chorus of opinion that inefficiency should be equated
with prejudice are occasional discordant notes. One is sounded by Professor
Gross, who disagrees that efficiency is a valid principle of trials at all. He
argues that American litigation is inherently inefficient, and that this inefficiency furthers the legitimate goals of litigation-especially arriving at
42
accurate verdicts-better than efficiency.
Another concern is voiced by Professor Leonard, who similarly rejects
the notion that efficiency for its own sake is a legitimate goal of trial
procedure. Leonard argues that efficiency only justifies excluding evidence
when exclusion also would advance the trial's truth-seeking function. Delay
and waste of time on trivial matters warrants exclusion because it can cause
jurors to forget important evidence or become confused about the proper
basis for decision, not just for the sake of efficiency. 43 Thus, to Professor
Leonard, it would be superfluous to include inefficiency among the meanings
of prejudice.
A third caution comes from Professor Dolan. He asserts that in reality,
appellate courts rarely rely on efficiency concerns alone as justification for
excluding evidence. 144 Dolan's observation appears accurate. Despite the
modern emphasis on the need for efficient litigation, 145 few courts cite it as
139. See FED. R. Evm. 403 ("undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence"); FED. R. Evm. 102 (these rules are to be construed to eliminate "expense
and delay"); FED. R. Evm. 611(a) (court shall control presentation of evidence so as to avoid
needless consumption of time).
140. E.g., I J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 59, 403[06]; Dolan, supra note 29,
at 226. See also Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining the Truth in
Judicial Trials, 66 COLM. L. REv. 223, 241 (1966) (among goals of trials are economizing
resources, creating rules that are easy to apply, adding to system's efficiency).
141. See MCCORMICK ON EvIDENCE, supra note 122, § 185 (evidence excludable if proof and
counter-proof will consume undue amount of time); J. MAGUJIRE, supra note 22, at 205
(character evidence excluded in part to avoid wasting courts's timeJ; Trautman, supra note 22,
at 392 (evidence may be excluded if it will consume too much time or unnecessarily embarrass
the personnel of the court). See also Park, The Hearsay Rule and the Stability of Verdicts: A
Response to Professor Nesson, 70 MINN. L. REv. 1057 (1986) (hearsay excluded to avoid
waste of time, high costs).
142. Gross, The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation, 85 MicH. L.
REv. 734, 740, 748-56 (1987).
143. Leonard, supra note 97, at 12-13.
144. Dolan, supra note 29, at 242-43.
145. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 181 (1986) (use of unitary capital jury, despite
its proven tendency to result in conviction-prone juries, justified in interests of efficiency);
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11, 14 (1983) (right to counsel limited in interests of efficient
trial schedules and convenience of witnesses); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S.
858, 865 (1982) (deportation of potential defense witness by prosecutor handling case justified
in part because housing aliens imposes financial burden on government). But cf. State v. King,
12 Ohio App. 2d 38, 230 N.E.2d 652 (1967) (closing arguments may not be limited to
accommodate crowded court schedule).
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justification for excluding evidence. In a random sample of seventy-three

common law prejudice rule cases from 1945 to 1987, not a single opinion
explicitly recognized inefficiency, delay, or waste of time as a form of
prejudice.46 In a second random sample of eighty-four cases from jurisdic-

tions that have enacted Rule 403, which explicitly sanctions exclusion of
inefficient evidence, only three opinions cited inefficiency as justifying the
exclusion of evidence. 1 47 Not a single federal case in the sample even
discussed efficiency except to reprint Rule 403 verbatim.

Cases in which the exclusion of evidence on efficiency grounds is unambiguously approved are rare.'4 When courts do approve the exclusion of

cumulative, time-wasting evidence, they usually also justify the exclusion on
independent grounds-the evidence confuses the jury 149 or invades the privacy of a witness, 50 or completely lacks relevance.' In a few opinions,
courts explicitly state that the exclusion of evidence on efficiency grounds

is disfavored, even if the evidence is cumulative and repetitive.5 2 Thus,

some scholars have suggested that efficiency is, if not totally superfluous,
at least an inferior principle compared to truth-seeking and adversarial
fairness.' 53

146. The sample was drawn by selecting the third annotation in the second column on every
odd-numbered page under all headnotes in the Decennial Digests relating to relevancy, the
prejudice rule, and specific applications of the rule in both civil and criminal cases. Those are
the headnotes covering the equivalent of Federal Rules of Evidence 401-411. The choices of
the third case, second column and odd page were random. These cases were then read, and
those not involving the application of the prejudice rule rejected. The possibility of bias in
the way the cases are coded and categorized by the West Publishing Company was reduced
by comparing this sample to a smaller one drawn in similar fashion from the two dozen state
evidence treatises available in the University of Iowa College of Law library, which produced
no obvious inconsistencies.
147. The sample produced 21 federal cases decided after the effective date of Rule 403, and
63 appellate opinions from states that had a version of Rule 403 in effect. The sample was
drawn from annotations in decennial digests in the manner described supra note 146, and
verified by a parallel sample drawn from annotated editions of the Federal and Uniform Rules.
148. One such case is Kim, 64 Haw. at 606-07, 645 P.2d at 1337 (whether the trial would
be unnecessarily delayed by the creation of a battle of experts). See also Rittenhoffer v. Cutter,
83 N.J.L. 613, 83 A. 873 (1912) (character evidence in civil case excluded because it would
make the trial intolerably long and tedious and greatly increase the expense and delay of
litigation).
149. Murdock v. State, 664 P.2d 589 (Alaska App. 1983) (cumulative evidence prejudicial
if it also threatens to mislead jury); Titworth, 255 N.W.2d at 246 (prejudice "increased as
more time and attention are diverted from the facts").
150. State v. Zuck, 134 Ariz. 509, 513, 658 P.2d 162, 166 (1983) (repetitive evidence
excludable if it also invades privacy of witness).
151. State v. Hults, 9 Wash. App. 297, 303, 513 P.2d 89, 93 (1973).
152. E.g., Martin v. State, 453 N.E.2d 1001 (Ind. 1983) (exclusion required only if wastes
time and is also prejudicial for some other reason); State v. Hutchinson, 99 N.M. 616, 62425, 661 P.2d 1315, 1323-24 (1983) (evidence not excludable just because repetitious).
153. E.g., Gold, supra note 10, at 65 (administrative goals like efficiency are inferior to
truth-seeking and adversarial fairness goals).
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The paucity of case authority does not mean that time-wasting should be
dropped from the definition of prejudice. To do so would be inconsistent
with the general principle that efficiency is an important objective of the
litigation system. That theory sees routine expression both by courts 5 4 and
legal scholars. 55 For example, attorney participation in the voir dire of
prospective jurors has been curtailed and even eliminated in the name of
efficiency.15 6 The number of witnesses and amount of time available for
presenting evidence may be limited.157 Even closing arguments, which have
been held to be a constitutional right,' can be regulated for efficiency.
Courts routinely approve the imposing of time limits as short as fifteen
minutes. 59 It would be incongruous for evidence presentation to be the one
aspect of the trial to be exempt from efficiency concerns.
Despite Gross's complaint that efficiency is a poor measure of the quality
of a litigation system, '6 the weight of opinion is that efficiency deserves a
place among the principles of evidence law protected by the prejudice rule.
There is a unity of theme that underlies the corpus of evidence law.
The rules are intended to increase the likelihood that adjudicative
outcomes comport with the values of administrative efficiency, fairness,
and reliable factfinding at trial. . . .In different circumstances, each
value may have a different priority, and one may sometimes be arrayed
against the others. Speedy trials, for example, may promote cost-effective
processing of cases but could
work unfairness to certain litigants and
61
enhance factfinding errors.

154. See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 181 (use of unitary capital jury, despite its proven tendency
to be conviction-prone, justified in interests of efficiency); Morris, 461 U.S. at 11, 14 (right
to counsel limited in interests of efficient trial schedules and convenience of witnesses);
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 865 (deportation of potential defense witness by prosecutor
handling case justified in part because housing aliens imposes financial burden on government);
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126-29, 134 (1982) (writ of habeas corpus entails significant
costs, extends ordeal, undermines certainty and finality, wastes resources).
155. See Arenella, supra note 103, at 199-200 (need to allocate scarce dispute resolution
resources efficiently); Pulaski, Criminal Trials: "'A Search for Truth" or Something Else?, 16
Caim. L. BULL. 41, 41-42 (1980) (importance of finality); Weinstein, supra note 140, at 241
(economizing of resources).
156. See Tanford, An Introduction to Trial Law, 51 Mo. L. REv. 623, 628-29, 632 (1987).
157. E.g., MCI Communications v. American Tel. & Tel., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.) (order
limiting parties to 26 days for cases-in-chief upheld), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 891 (1983); Maloney
v. Wake Hosp. Sys., 45 N.C. App. 173, 262 S.E.2d 680 (1980) (court may limit cumulative
witnesses).
158. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975). This has always been the uniform opinion
of the state courts as well. See Tanford, Closing Argument Procedure, 10 AM. J. TUAL AD.
47, 50-65 (1986).
159. E.g., Kelley v. State, 7 Ark. App. 130, 644 S.W.2d 638 (upholding 15-minute time
limit), petition for review denied, 278 Ark. 497, 646 S.W.2d 703 (1983). See Tanford, supra
note 158, at 72-74.
160. Gross, supra note 142, at 740.
161. Loh, supra note 100, at 18. See also J.MAGUntE, supra note 22, at 205 (rules of
character evidence reflect desire to avoid wasting time on remote issue).
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E.

Undermining the PoliticalInterests of the State

In 1889, Thayer proposed another definition of prejudice. Without stating
whether he approved, Thayer suggested that judges routinely excluded
relevant evidence in order to further important political interests of the
state. He called evidence that undermined those interests "impolitic," and
asserted that courts would limit evidence when they feared the political
consequences of admitting it.162 Thayer neither explained in detail what he

meant, nor gave any examples, nor cited any cases in support. He never
followed up on this brief reference in more detail, and it apparently
generated no scholarly debate. When the ALI advisory committee met fifty
years later to draft the Model Rules of Evidence, they never even discussed
the possibility of defining prejudice this way.163 Neither the Model Rules
nor its progeny, the Uniform and Federal Rules, included undermining the
political interests of the state among their definitions of prejudice.
However, the idea of a political dimension to the prejudice rule has
recently resurfaced. Professor Letwin suggests that political considerations
often play a part in evidence decisions in criminal trials. If permitting certain
kinds of evidence would threaten the state's interest in detecting and
prosecuting criminal acts, courts will exclude it. He argues, for example,
that evidence of the unchaste character of rape victims is excluded in order
to encourage the reporting of crime and increase convictions, thereby
facilitating the state's ability to prosecute its rape laws.'" Professor Trautman has articulated a slightly different political use of the prejudice rule.
He suggests that courts also exclude as prejudicial evidence that would
65
embarrass the personnel of the court or upset members of the community.
Those observations are consistent with many comments on the criminal
justice system generally. For example, Seidman describes the Burger Court's
criminal procedure decisions as being mostly intended to further a crime
control strategy, rather than the fair or accurate determination of guilt.'6

In all these descriptions, however, is a tone of criticism-the suggestion
that trials should not be used to further the political interests of the state.
Only Professor Nesson has even indirectly suggested that a political dimension to the rules of evidence might be a good thing, arguing that evidence
law needs to facilitate public acceptance of verdicts. 67
162. Thayer, supra note 116, at 145.
163. See A.L.I., Code of Rules of Evidence 11-14 (Preliminary draft No. 10, 1940); A.L.I.,
Minutes of Evidence Conference held at Northeast Harbor, Maine, supra note 27, at 19-21.
164. Letwin, "Unchaste Character," Ideology, and the CaliforniaRape Evidence Laws, 54

S. CAL. L. REv. 35, 59 n.81 (1980).

165. Trautman, supra note 22, at 392.

166. See Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and
Change in CriminalProcedure, 80 CoLusr. L. REv. 436, 437-38 (1980).
167. Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of
Verdicts, 98 HARv. L. RPv. 1357, 1357-60, 1367-69 (1985).
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A theory of the meaning of prejudice must include some kind of ideo-

logical dimension if it intends to account for all the cases. Appellate opinions
justify excluding evidence under the prejudice rule for the good of society, 68
or to promote respect for the administration of justice. 6 9 The most common
political justification is the need for crime control. Courts assert that the
state has an interest in detecting and prosecuting crime, and preventing
wrongdoers from escaping justice. Therefore, under the prejudice rule,
judges may consider "whether admitting testimony ... might have the
effect of deterring the reporting of crimes.' 7 0° On such grounds, courts
have excluded evidence of the prior sexual history of rape victims, 7 ' and

tried to limit cross-examination of child witnesses. 72
Crime control ideology also appears to affect the way courts apply the

prejudice rule. Some courts have held that defense evidence must demonstrate a higher standard of relevancy than incriminating evidence. 73 Others
exclude defense evidence that would have been admitted if offered by the
state, especially evidence of prior crimes to impeach one of the state's

witnesses.

74

The ideology of punitive justice is occasionally asserted in civil
75

cases as well.

168. See Gould, 134 La. at 128, 63 So. at 850 (excluding evidence because it would be bad
for society if wrongdoers escaped justice).
169. See Beachman, 189 Mont. 400, 616 P.2d 337 (evidence that prosecutor smoked
marijuana excluded as prejudicial); Bradley v. Onstott, 180 Ind. 687, 692, 103 N.E. 798, 799
(1914) ("the trial may be embarrassed"); Garvik v. Burlington, C.R. & N. Ry., 124 Iowa 691,
694-95, 100 N.W. 498, 500 (1904) (civil case in which defendant's employee accused of rape,
defense wanted him to show penis to jury to prove incapacitated; held too indecent, would
disgrace administration of justice, subject courts to ridicule).
170. Kim, 64 Haw. at 606-07, 645 P.2d at 1337 (summarizing state rule).
171. E.g., Johnson v. State, 146 Ga. App. 277, 280, 246 S.E.2d 363, 365 (1978). See
Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L.
REv. 544, 566-67 (1980).
172. E.g., People v. District Court, 719 P.2d 722, 726 (Colo. 1986) (en banc) (can restrict
embarrassing questions); State v. Strable, 313 N.W.2d 497, 499 (Iowa 1981) (trial court placed
blackboard between child and defendant).
173. See State v. Rodriquez, 145 Ariz. 157, 167-68, 700 P.2d 855, 865 (1985) (expert
testimony on unreliability of eyewitness identification excluded because not of "considerable"
relevance; no particular prejudicial effect articulated); Hinds v. State, 469 N.E.2d 31, 38 (Ind.
App. 1984) (defendant who tries to introduce evidence that another committed similar crimes
to disprove identity must meet "stricter standard of relevance" than state must meet to offer
evidence of the defendant's prior crimes to prove identity; difference is state's interest in
prosecuting its criminal laws).
174. See United States v. Solomon, 686 F.2d 863, 872-73 (11th Cir. 1982) (approving
exclusion of evidence of chief state's witness's convictions, although witness's credibility was
crucial issue, then upholding conviction because the jury found witness credible and appeals
court not supposed to second-guess); Couture, 146 Vt. at 276, 502 A.2d at 852 (refusing to
allow defendant to impeach state's witness with evidence of a prior felony conviction); Murdock,
664 P.2d 589 (defense not allowed to prove victim's long criminal record).
175. Gould, 134 La. at 128, 63 So. at 850 (evidence of a civil defendant's good character
excluded on the grounds that it interfered with the state's interest in making sure wrongdoers
were punished).
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Crime control is not the only facet of prevailing American ideology
asserted to justify excluding relevant evidence. Other political reasons may
weigh against permitting evidence to be introduced. State v. Zuck176 makes
a good example. Zuck was charged with robbery and kidnapping. The case
against him was based almost entirely on the testimony of a man who
claimed to be an accomplice, although there was little evidence to suggest
the witness had been involved in the crime. The defense wanted to introduce
evidence of the witness's past psychiatric history of paranoia and schizophrenia to explain why he might be falsely confessing. The court asserted
two political reasons for excluding it. One was the state's interest in detecting
and prosecuting crime. The court said that if people thought embarrassing
evidence about themselves would be made public, potential witnesses might
not come forward. The other was the importance of individual privacy.
Allowing lawyers to pry into prior psychiatric records would invade the
witness's privacy. In addition, the court implicitly feared that admitting the
evidence could result in the defendant's acquittal. Almost any acquittal is
politically damaging to the state because it has a delegitimizing effect. It
frustrates the state's need to appear to be preserving order, undercuts the
ability of the trial to serve its ritual function of defining the boundaries of
acceptable behavior, and raises doubts about the ability of the police,
prosecutor, and courts to protect the public from criminals. The court
therefore excluded the evidence.
The scattered opinions that actually discuss the political expediency of
admitting evidence are consistent with empirical research showing that
judges' decisions are influenced by political ideology, whether or not there
is any explicit acknowledgment of that fact in the written opinion. 177 For
example, a study of criminal cases by Rowland, Songer and Carp compared
decisions by judges appointed by President Reagan to those appointed by
President Carter. They found that Reagan appointees to both the trial and
appellate courts were significantly more likely to decide in favor of the
178
government and against defendants.
A theory of evidence law that denies that trials serve political functions
would be inconsistent with contemporary socio-legal theory. Trials are
among the most visible legal events, and therefore will serve an important
social symbolic function whether intended or not. Functionalists like Durkheim point out that trials help define the limits of acceptable social conduct,
reinforcing community behavioral and moral norms. In this respect, the
public perception about how trials are conducted is just as important as

176. 134 Ariz. 509, 513, 658 P.2d 162, 166 (1983).
177. See Champagne & Nagel, supra note 7 (summarizing research). See also R. NEELY,
supra note 43, at 10 (Chief Justice Neely of the West Virginia Supreme Court writes that
courts are not neutral; rather, judges let politics and emotion influence decisions.).
178. Rowland, Songer & Carp, supra note 46, at 195-98.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:831

actual procedural fairness or verdict accuracy.179 Judicial decisions about
what evidence to admit or exclude thus will inevitably constitute symbolic
statements about social values.
Judges are government officials, of course. As such, they will tend to
assert the values and interests of the state when making discretionary
decisions. Modem Weberian social theory views government not just as a
servant of public interests, 18 0 but as an independent organization with its
own interests and goals. Most members of an organization will naturally
try to advance the autonomy and power of their organization when they
make decisions.'' Thus, judges will tend to rule in ways that preserve the
dignity and status of the courts. To the extent that judges see themselves
as members of the government generally, they will be likely to rule in ways
that reinforce the prevailing ideology of the state.

Explicit recognition of a political dimension to the rules of evidence seems
preferable to pretending that it does not exist. A fourth definition of
prejudice then becomes appropriate: Evidence is prejudicial if it undermines
the trial's political function. Judges may exclude evidence that threatens
82
facets of prevailing ideology, such as individual privacy and crime control.
They may exclude evidence so that the trial's appearance coincides with
public expectations that it will be conducted fairly, will respect the dignity
4
of the individual,8 3 and will punish those perceived to be wrongdoers.'1
This will facilitate public acceptance of trials as a good way for society to

resolve disputes,

s5

thereby legitimating the state's claim to a monopoly over

coercive dispute resolution.

179. See Goodpaster, supra note 98, at 140-46. See also Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496,
508 (1987) (trials must be, and also appear to be, fair).
180. The State may sometimes disguise its interests by using the rhetoric of acting in the
public interest. N. PoULANTZAs, PoLITIcA.

POWER ANfD

SOCIAL CLASSES 50, 123, 130-34 (T.

O'Hagan trans. 1975).
181. See Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,
in BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN 9-16 (P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer & T. Skocpol eds. 1985);
R. Stryker, Limits on Technocratization of the Law: The Elimination of the NLRB's Division
of Economic Research 18-22 (University Microfilms 1986); Stryker, Limits on Technocratization
of Law: The Elimination of the National Labor Relations Board's Division of Economic
Research, 54 AM. Soc. REv. 341, 342-43 (1989).
182. See Scheingold & Gressett, Policy, Politics, and the Criminal Courts, 1987 AM. B.
FouND. REs. J. 461, 464-69 (The political culture of criminal trials reflects two competing and
often incompatible ideological value systems: "crime control," which requires that trials help
preserve social order, and "due process," which requires that trials help preserve individual
rights.).
183. Arenella, supra note 103, at 200-08. See also Leonard, supra note 97, at 2-3 (also must
satisfy expectations of individual litigants).
184. Nesson, supra note 167, at 1357-60, 1368-69. See also Weinstein, supra note 140, at
241 (trials must tranquilize disputants).
185. Loh, supra note 100, at 16.
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III.

PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE
THE PROCEDURE FOR LInriNG PREYuDucIAL EVIDENCE

Identifying evidence as prejudicial does not resolve whether evidence with
prejudicial characteristics is admissible or inadmissible. Trial judges- often
will have to make a decision under conditions of uncertainty. Some evidence
both will display characteristics defined as prejudicial and also will possess
some degree of relevance. For example, in a criminal case involving eyewitness identification, the defense may offer the testimony of an expert
psychologist to provide the "social framework" 1 6 necessary to give the jury
a realistic understanding of the problems of eyewitness unreliability. Such
testimony would be of some assistance to the jury in reaching an accurate
assessment of the defendant's guilt. Its admission also would entail some
risks. The jurors might take it out of context and base their decision on
scientific generalities rather than a serious discussion of the evidence. The
evidence injects an issue of the scientific validity of the underlying psychological research that could take considerable time to explore. Allowing this
testimony threatens the legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system that
depends heavily on eyewitnesses. Thus, both relevance and potential prejudice are present in uncertain degrees.
Without a workable procedural mechanism for resolving disputes over
the admissibility of evidence with conflicting characteristics, trial judges'
rulings are likely to vary. Some judges may look at the cup as half full
and admit the evidence because it possesses some relevance and therefore
furthers verdict accuracy. 187 Others may see the cup as half empty and
exclude the evidence because of its potential prejudicial effect.18 Some may
allow their biases to dictate their decisions. 189 If this happens, the inevitability
of wide variation in decisions likely to have significant impact on the verdict
is reintroduced.1
A.

Impartial Balancing

The traditional model for deciding the admissibility of evidence that is
both relevant and prejudicial is the weighted balancing test of Federal Rule
186. See Walker & Monahan, Social Frameworks:A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73
VA. L. Ray. 559 (1987).
187. See, e.g., State v. Buell, 22 Ohio St. 3d 124, 129-30, 489 N.E.2d 795, 801, cert. denied,
479 U.S. 871 (1986); State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 292-97, 660 P.2d 1208, 1218-24 (1983)
(both approving use of eyewitness experts).
188. See, e.g., United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381 (Ist Cir. 1979) (danger of causing
more confusion than it clears up; jurors delegating task to expert); State v. Rodriquez, 145
Ariz. 157, 167-68, 700 P.2d 855, 865-66 (1985) (factual confusion).
189. See Rodriquez, 145 Ariz. at 167-68, 700 P.2d at 865-66 (court's discussion of evidence,
including its conclusion that eyewitness identifications in this case were "positive," indicates
court believed defendant was probably guilty and was afraid expert evidence might create
enough doubt for an acquittal; evidence excluded).
190. For discussion of the empirical evidence that expert testimony on eyewitness unreliability
can affect verdicts, see Wells, Lindsay & Tousignant, supra note 38. See also Wells, supra
note 38, at 61-62 (summarizing research).
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of Evidence 403. If evidence possesses both characteristics, it is admissible
unless the prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value.

Wigmore was the first evidence scholar to articulate this balancing test
as the most appropriate paradigm for limiting prejudicial evidence.' 9' Wigmore's views dominated the development of evidence law in the early
twentieth century, 192 profoundly influencing the way judges and scholars

conceptualized it. It is no wonder, then, that his balancing test became the
predominant theoretical explication of the mechanics of the prejudice rule.
By 1940, when eminent scholars like Morgan, Maguire, Ladd and McCormick assembled to draft the ALI Model Code of Evidence, no one

questioned that this was the most appropriate model of what the courts
were (and should be) doing. 193
Disagreements about the balancing test have been minor, mostly concerning how the scales should be weighted. Professor Dolan suggests that too

much prejudicial evidence gets before the jury, and proposes that the scale
be rebalanced to favor exclusion.

94

Nixon's Justice Department argued in

the other direction, that not enough prejudicial evidence was heard by the
jury, and urged that judges be given discretion to admit even substantially

prejudicial evidence.1 95

Despite the consensus among evidence scholars, there are fundamental
problems with the balancing paradigm. Wigmore developed it as part of an

overall theory that derived all meanings of prejudice from the single principle
that trials were supposed to reveal the truth. 96 To Wigmore, balancing
made sense because similar qualities were on both sides of the scale: the
tendency of evidence to facilitate truth seeking (relevancy) versus its tendency
to obscure and suppress truth. The modern understanding, however, is that

191. J. WiGMORE, supra note 21, §§ 42, 1904. The balancing test first appeared several years

earlier in I S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE, § 14a (J. Wigmore 16th ed. 1899), but
that section was added by Wigmore; it did not appear in earlier editions of Greenleaf's treatise.
192. See A.L.I., Minutes of Evidence Conference held at New York City, Jan. 17-19, 1942,
at 2-3 (mimeo on file in University of Iowa Law Library) (committee consisting of Professors
Morgan, Maguire, Ladd and McCormick noting that every lawyer in the U.S. knows Wigmore's
name and thinks of him as God when it comes to evidence).
193. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 303 (1942) (judge may exclude evidence if he finds
that its probative value is outweighed by the risk that its admission will create prejudice).
Discussions of the proposed rule can be found in A.L.I., Minutes of Evidence Conference
held at Northeast Harbor, Maine, supra note 27, at 19-23; A.L.I., Minutes of Evidence
Conference held at the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Dec. 18-21, 1940, at
1-2 (mimeo on file at University of Iowa Law Library); A.L.I., Minutes of Evidence Conference
held at New York City, supra note 192, at 19.
194. See Dolan, supra note 29, at 233.
195. See D. LOuISELL & C. MUELLER, supranote 30, § 124, at 5-6 (Nixon Justice Department
argued for explicit statement in Federal Rules that judge could admit evidence even if prejudicial
effect substantially outweighed probative value). See also Dente v. Riddell, 664 F.2d I (Ist
Cir. 1981) (interpreting Federal Rule 403's use of word "may" as permitting trial judge to

ignore the written rule and make own decision whether to admit or exclude prejudicial evidence).
196. J. WiGMom, supra note 21, § 1904.
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prejudice comprises several quite distinct values-factual and legal accuracy,
adversariness, efficiency, and numerous aspects of political ideology. That
means that different qualities now must occupy the two sides of the scale.
Thomas Grey has criticized the use of a balancing metaphor in this kind
of situation. He argues that the metaphor is inappropriate when there exists
no procedure by which judges can measure the competing qualities or
convert them to a common scale. 197 He gives an example of how impossible
such a task is by quoting a statement from Rowland v. Christian,19 that
whether there is a duty in tort will be determined by balancing:
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that
the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, l the policy of preventing
future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences
to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting
liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance
for the risk involved."9

Analyzing how judges choose among incommensurable and conflicting values by invoking the metaphor of balancing masks the true political or
existential nature of those decisions with the "pseudo-science" of legal
formalism. This, Grey argues, is fundamentally inconsistent with contemporary hermeneutical jurisprudence.m
A second problem with the balancing paradigm is that it appears inconsistent with the way prejudice is handled at other stages of the trial, such
as in closing argument. In closing argument, the parties may make any
relevant argument they want to, however illogical and remote the possibility,
as long as it is based on evidence. No argument is prohibited as long as it
has some minimal connection to the facts and law, even if it also has
substantial potential to confuse issues, waste time, or undermine the state's
interests. No balancing takes place. If the argument has any legitimate
purpose it is allowed. For example, suppose evidence has been introduced
in a criminal case that the defendant's father had been convicted of a
crime, 201 and the jury has been instructed that bias can affect credibility.
The prosecuting attorney may argue that the defendant probably knew
about her parents' criminal activities, probably sided with the parents and
resented the state's arresting them, is now probably still angry at the state,
197. Grey, supra note 13, at 8 n.26, 50-52. Grey was referring to choices by appellate
judges, but his argument is equally applicable to choices by trial judges.
198. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
199. Grey, supra note 13, at 52 n.183 (Grey misquotes Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 113, 443
P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100; the missing clause at [] reads, "the moral blame attached
to the defendant's conduct.").
200. Grey, supra note 13, at 50-52.
201. See Clark v. State, 264 Ind. 524, 324 N.E.2d 27 (1976), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1050
(1978).
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and therefore is unlikely to tell the truth. The defense attorney is assumed

to be capable of pointing out how silly such an argument is, and the jury
is trusted to ignore it. What the attorneys may not do in argument is try
to divert the jurors away from the evidence. The parties may not try to
induce jurors to rely on emotions instead of facts, 20 2 to disregard the law, 203
or to forsake their impartiality.? 4 A general parallel exists between the rules
of admissible evidence and the rules of permissible arguments; 25 it is

anomalous for the prejudice rule to be the one exception.
The balancing paradigm also does not describe the cases very well.
Although most appellate opinions state the black-letter prejudice rule in
terms of balancing, 206 only about one-third give any indication that the
court actually engaged in a good faith attempt to follow the balancing
procedure. 207 As often as not, courts appear to be paying mere lip service

to the idea. Faced with a situation involving both relevancy and prejudice,
courts announce the balancing metaphor, but then do not use it to determine
the admissibility of potentially prejudicial evidence. Instead, they appear to

202. E.g., Klein v. Herring, 347 So. 2d 681 (Fla. App. 1977) (asking jury to consider
defendant's vast resources when setting damages). See Tanford, supra note 156, at 685-91.
203. E.g., State v. Thomas, 307 Minn. 229, 239 N.W.2d 455 (1976). See Tanford, supra
note 156, at 691-92.
204. E.g., Stanley v. Ellegood, 382 S.W.2d 572 (Ky. 1964) (error to ask the jury to put
themselves in plaintiff's position when deciding the amount of damages-the so-called "golden
rule" argument).
205. E.g., compare FED. R. Evm. 411 (evidence of liability insurance not admissible) with
Altenbaumer v. Lion Oil Co., 186 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1950) (error to raise insurance in
argument), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951); compare FED. R. Evm. 201 (court may take
judicial notice of facts of common knowledge, no evidence required) with State v. Williams,
107 Ariz. 262, 485 P.2d 832 (1971) (attorney in argument may tell jury about growing crime
problem; a matter of common knowledge; no evidence required).
206. A random sample of prejudice rule cases, drawn according to the procedure discussed
in note 146, supra, produced the following results: Of 62 state court opinions from jurisdictions
adopting Rule 403, 39 (63%) claimed to be using a balancing test, 15 (24%) said they used
some other procedure, chiefly the presence or absence of relevance, and eight (13%) gave no
indication what they were doing. Of 57 opinions from common law states, 31 (54%) stated
that judges were supposed to balance, 18 (32%) described the procedure as something other
than balancing, and 8 (14%) gave no indication.
207. In a sample of 139 prejudice rule cases selected at random from both common law
and Federal Rule jurisdictions, only 50 (36%) showed any evidence of weighing. See note 146,
supra for description of sampling method. See United States v. Wyatt, 611 F.2d 568 (5th Cir.
1980) (in counterfeiting trial, government offered currency into evidence that had been stamped
with word "counterfeit;" danger of confusion of issues and misleading, but relevance outweighs
prejudice); Weiby v. Wente, 264 N.W.2d 624, 627-28 (Minn. Ct. App. 1978) (medical
misdiagnosis case; evidence of subsequent symptoms relevant to show that plaintiff was seriously
ill was inadmissable because it might mislead jury and confuse them as to applicable standard
of care by causing jury to assume symptoms probably discernible at time of misdiagnosis);
State v. Reingold, 49 Or. App. 781, 783-85, 620 P.2d 964, 965-66 (1980) (prosecution for
receiving stolen goods; prosecutor brought thief into court in shackles to be identified; probative
value low because thief did not testify, danger of misdecision high because jurors would
assume anyone could tell person was a thief), petition for review denied, 52 Or. App. 117,
631 P.2d 340 (1981).
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use a minimal relevancy test similar to the minimal-connection-to-evidence
test used to regulate closing arguments. If offered evidence has probative
20
value, however slight, it will be admissible regardless of prejudicial effect.
Evidence is only excluded if it lacks any relevancy and is offered solely to
cause prejudice.2
A good example is People v. Alsteens, 210 a murder case in which the
prosecution offered eight photographs of the victim to prove the position
of the body. The probative value of the photographs was slight, since they
were offered only to acquaint the jury with the uncontested circumstances
surrounding the scene of the crime. The prejudicial effect was significant
enough for the appeals court to refer to the use of multiple photographs
as unnecessary and to "disapprove of their admission." Although the court
stated that the prejudice rule required balancing, it determined that the
photographs were properly admissible by looking only at whether they had
material
probative value. The court held that they were 'instructive to' show
21
facts' [and not] merely 'calculated to excite . . . prejudice." '
In some opinions, courts appear to forsake even the pretext of balancing
in favor of the minimal relevancy test. Several courts have done so
explicitly. The North Carolina Supreme Court stated that "[rielevant
evidence will not be excluded simply because it may tend to prejudice the
opponent or excite sympathy," but only "if the only effect of the evidence
is to excite prejudicial sympathy. ' 212 The Illinois Supreme Court has said
"[e]vidence which is otherwise admissible

.

. .is not rendered inadmis-

sible by its potentially prejudicial impact.' '213 Similar statements appear
in cases from Louisiana, 21 4 Arizona, 2 5 Georgia, 216 Indiana,21 7 and New
208. See Shaffer, Judges, Repulsive Evidence and the Ability to Respond, 43 NoTmE DAME
503, 504-06 (1968) (report of Indiana Judicial Conference discussion among judges on
controlling exhibits as generally agreeing that if relevant and accurate, exhibits should be
admitted regardless of their prejudicial effect).
209. E.g., United States v. Calandrella, 605 F.2d 236, 254 (6th Cir.) (fraud case; witness
testified about prior unrelated conduct that showed not fraud but bad judgment; minimal
relevance to show his "business acumen"; no prejudice under 403 because of slight probative
value; admissible), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991 (1979).
210. 49 Mich. App. 467, 212 N.W.2d 243 (1973).
211. Id. at 477-78, 212 N.W.2d at 248 (quoting People v. Eddington, 387 Mich. App. 551,
562, 198 N.W.2d 297, 301 (1972). See also United States v. Henry, 727 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir.
1984) (evidence of prior illegal acts relevant background, because not offered solely to impugn
the defendant's character).
212. State v. Swift, 290 N.C. 383, 396, 226 S.E.2d 652, 662 (1976).
213. People v. Foster, 76 Ill. 2d 365, 374, 392 N.E.2d 6, 9 (1979).
214. State v. Clift, 339 So. 2d 755, 760 (La. 1976) ("If evidence is relevant . . .the fact
that it is prejudicial does not bar its admission.").
215. State v. Snodgrass, 121 Ariz. 409, 412, 590 P.2d 948, 951 (1979) (if photographs have
any relevance they are admissible despite tendency to arouse prejudice).
216. Cagle Poultry & Egg Co, v. Busick, 110 Ga. App. 551, 552, 139 S.E.2d 461, 463
(1964) (relevant photographs are not subject to objection as prejudicial).
217. City of Terre Haute v. Deckard, 243 Ind. 289, 295, 183 N.E.2d 815, 818 (1962)
(material evidence not inadmissible because it is prejudicial).
LAw.
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York. 218 In Oklahoma, the legislature omitted the words "although relevant" from its version of Rule 403,219 thereby deleting any language that
could be interpreted as requiring balancing.
Other courts have implicitly abandoned the balancing procedure. Commonly, when an appellate court reviews a claim that unduly prejudicial
evidence was admitted, they examine the evidence only for probative value.
If they find it, the inquiry stops, as if no further analysis were required. For
example, People v. Bailey ° is an armed robbery case in which the evidence
against Bailey was weak. Only the co-defendant had been identified. Bailey
objected to testimony that he frequently associated with the co-defendant on
prejudice grounds. The court carefully analyzed relevancy and determined
that because friends were more likely to be accomplices than strangers, the
evidence had a small degree of probative value. Then it stopped. The court
held the evidence properly admissible without even discussing prejudicial
effect. Other courts similarly have ended their review without discussing
prejudicial effect after finding minimal relevancy to testimony about a homicide victim's young children,2' evidence of a corporate defendant's wealth,m
a wedding photograph of a murder victim,22 and an "emotionally gripping"
record of a dying declaration2 4
Most situations in which the courts engage only in cursory review for
minimal relevancy, and uphold the admissibility of evidence without balancing, involve inculpatory evidence admitted against criminal defendants.
Even if the trial judge admitted highly prejudicial evidence against a
defendant, the appellate courts tend to approve of that decision.? For
218. Leotta v. Plessinger, 8 N.Y.2d 449, 461-62, 171 N.E.2d 454, 460, 209 N.Y.S.2d 304,
312-13 (1960) (evidence if relevant "cannot be excluded on the ground that it might be
prejudicial").
219. OKA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2403 (West 1980). See also Roberts v. State, 561 P.2d
511, 518 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) (evidence admissible if it has some relevance, excludable
only if offered solely to prejudice jury).
220. 36 Mich. App. 272, 277-78, 193 N.W.2d 405, 407 (1972). See also United States v.
Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124, 1131 (5th Cir.) (once court determined evidence of prior criminality
to be relevant, inquiry stopped; prejudice not discussed), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1063 (1980);
McCarson v. Foreman, 102 N.M. 151, 692 P.2d 537 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (court finds truck
driver's prior involvement with cocaine trafficking has some relevance on issue of negligent
entrustment; does not discuss potential prejudicial effect).
221. People v. Free, 94 Ill. 2d 378, 413-15, 447 N.E.2d 218, 235-36, cert. denied, 464 U.S.
865 (1983).
222. Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 387-89, 35 Cal. Rptr. 183, 188-89 (1964).
223. State v. Hutchinson, 99 N.M. 616, 624-25, 661 P.2d 1315, 1323-24 (1983).
224. State v. Larson, 281 N.W.2d 481 (Minn.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979).
225. See Perry v. State, 158 Ga. App. 349, 352-53, 280 S.E.2d 390, 392-93 (1981) (evidence
defendant seen masturbating relevant to show intent in rape case); State v. Chavis, 617 S.W.2d
903 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980) (evidence defendant was in the area where the rape occurred 24
hours earlier relevant to show identity in burglary/rape case); Hammen v. State, 87 Wis. 2d
791, 797-99, 275 N.W.2d 709, 713 (1979) (evidence defendant involved in drug dealing relevant
to show his state of mind for assaulting a woman); State v. Ledet, 337 So. 2d 1126, 1128
(La. 1976) (evidence of gun not used in robbery and not found in defendant's possession
relevant because presence of two guns makes use of gun in robbery more likely).
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example, in Dresser v. State,226 the Indiana Supreme Court determined that
gruesome photographs were unnecessary, repetitive, inflammatory, had virtually no relevance, and "failed the balancing test," yet approved their
admission rather than reverse a conviction. 227 Empirical data demonstrate
that these are not isolated instances of bad decisionmaking, but that
appellate courts systematically rule against criminal defendants when making
prejudice rule decisions.? Some interpret this as evidence that judges do
not balance in good faith, but allow a bias against criminal defendants to
control the outcome. 229 Indeed, such a conclusion is virtually inescapable if
one starts with the assumption that judges are supposed to determine
admissibility by balancing relevancy against prejudicial effect.
However, what if the assumption of balancing is wrong? The failure of
the balancing test to account for many of the cases, its inconsistency with
the procedure used to limit prejudicial arguments, and Grey's criticism,
suggest that the balancing metaphor is inappropriate. There may be an
alternative procedural paradigm that better describes the cases, is more
compatible with general trial procedures, and would be of more assistance
to judges trying to reach consistent, principled decisions. One such alternative model is that when evidence has both relevancy and prejudicial effect,
thereby advancing some of the trial's functions and undermining others, its
admissibility is determined by political choice.
B.

Political Choice

The political-choice paradigm begins with a premise: When a legal decision
involves conflicting fundamental values that cannot all be respected, it is
the province of the appellate courts, not the trial judges, to chose which
values to favor over others. This decision is a political choice. When evidence
has both probative value and prejudicial effect, the decision to admit or

226. 454 N.E.2d 406 (Ind. 1983).
227. Id. at 409.
228. In a random sample of opinions reviewing the admissibility of prejudicial evidence,
appellate courts reversed trial judges in favor of criminal defendants only 9% of the time (9/
96). For comparison purposes, the same sample produced reversal rates of 60% (3/5) in favor
of the state, and 38% (10/26) in favor of civil parties. The sample included both common
law and Rule 403 cases covering a twenty-year period (1967-86), drawn according to criteria
discussed supra in note 146.
229. E.g., Graham, supra note 44, at 578. See also Baer & Mills, Discretion and Disparity
on the Criminal Side of the Supreme Court in New York County, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rv.
691, 698-701 (1987); Zinn & Stewart, Ideology in the Courtroom, 21 NEw ENG. L. Ray. 711,
717 (1986) (both suggesting that judicial bias may be class-based, not directed against all
defendants, only lower social class defendants). The idea of class bias is reinforced by an
interesting piece of anecdotal evidence. In one group of 31 Supreme Court cases concerning
evidence and trial procedure between 1980 and 1986, Justice Rehnquist voted against the
defendant in all but one case. The one case in which he voted in the defendant's favor was
United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980), in which the defendant was a state legislator.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:831

exclude that evidence presents such a conflict. Admitting the evidence usually
will advance the trial's goal of achieving accurate verdicts based on complete
information, but may upset the trial's adversarial balance, threaten its
efficiency, or undermine its political symbolic role. Excluding such evidence
may preserve a fair adversarial balance, promote efficiency, and help the
trial fulfill its ritual function, but at the cost of reducing the jury's ability
to reach an accurate, fully informed verdict. Therefore, the decision to
admit or exclude evidence necessarily entails making a political choice to
favor some values over others. This approach avoids the misleading implication that there is a politically neutral basis, namely balancing, for deciding
which set of values takes precedence. It reveals rather than masks the
political nature of the admissibility decision, and is therefore likely ultimately
to reduce the wide variation now found in the cases.
Consider the use of gruesome photographs. Employing the traditional
balancing metaphor, one would expect to find three groups of cases. In
some cases, the photographs would have particular probative value on an
important issue and would be admissible. In other cases, the photographs
would be offered primarily to evoke emotional reactions in jurors, would
have only tangential relevancy, and would be inadmissible. In a third group,
the evidence would be about equally balanced between admissibility and
exclusion, with some cases being decided each way.
No such pattern exists. Instead, the cases uniformly hold that gruesome
photographs are admissible, even when the level of probative value is so
small as to be practically nonexistent. In Texas, for example, the appellate
courts did not reverse a single decision to admit gruesome photographs over
an eleven year period. 2 0 A survey of Indiana cases turned up no instances
in twenty-five years in which appellate courts reversed a decision to admit
23
gruesome photographs. '
These courts appear not to be balancing, but to have made a political
choice that gruesome photographs are admissible. Admitting the photographs furthers all the primary functions of the trial that the prejudice rule
is supposed to protect. A gruesome crime scene photograph provides relevant
information about what happened and provides no immaterial information,
so it furthers the goal of informed, accurate decisionmaking.232 Party control
over the selection of evidence and allowing the prosecution to prove its case

230. Reimer v. State, 657 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (surveying Texas cases).
231, J. TANFORD & R. Quw"N, supra note 80, § 48.5.
232. See State v, Montes, 136 Ariz. 491, 499, 667 P.2d 191, 199 (1983) (photos relevant to
show how crime was committed, to corroborate witnesses' testimony, to aid jury in understanding testimony, to show location of wounds, and to establish cause of death); King v.
State, 667 P.2d 474, 477 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (photo showing bloody crime scene was
more accurate than police officer's sketch).
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"to the hilt" are both consistent with adversarial procedures?.3 The photograph is efficient because it is easier and faster to use a photograph than
to have witnesses describe the scene in words. 234 It furthers the state's
interests by increasing the likelihood of conviction, demonstrating symbolically that the state is concerned with individual victims, and avoiding the
unpopular perception that relevant evidence is being excluded by a legal
system soft on crime.2 5 On appeal, the efficiency and political functions
are strengthened. Ordering a new trial is always inefficient. Ruling that the

trial judge made a serious mistake undermines the myth of judicial competence. Reversing convictions arouses public anger at the courts. Against
all these reasons to approve the admissibility of the gruesome photograph
is usually only a single argument that it may arouse the anger of the jury
and thus upset the fair balance of the adversary system. 236 The political
decision is easy, which explains why almost all cases reach the same result.
Or consider evidence of uncharged misconduct offered to prove motive,
intent, common plan or absence of mistake?.37 The tendency of jurors to
misuse such evidence as an indication of the defendant's criminal propensity
is obvious. Therefore, the balancing paradigm again leads one to expect to
find such evidence admitted if probative of a contested issue, and excluded
when only remotely relevant.
However, no such pattern is found in these cases either. Evidence of
uncharged misconduct is routinely held admissible when offered against a
defendant, even when the probative value is very low. 28 For example, in

233. See State v. Crenshaw, 98 Wash. 2d 789, 807, 659 P.2d 488, 498 (1983) (brutal crime
need not be explained to jury in lily-white manner, state may prove case to the hilt). See also
State v. McCall, 139 Ariz. 147, 158, 677 P.2d 920, 931 (1983) (state not required to prove
case in sterile manner), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1220 (1984).
234. See State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St. 3d 239, 265-66, 473 N.E.2d 768, 792 (1984) (photos
provided independent evidence; jury would be better able to conclude whether killing was
deliberate by seeing wounds), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1012 (1985); Commonwealth v. Chajifoux,
362 Mass. 811, 817, 291 N.E.2d 635, 639 (1973) (although point could have been made by
oral testimony, it was more effectively demonstrated through photographs).
235. Cf. State v. Zuck, 134 Ariz. 509, 513, 658 P.2d 162, 166 (1983) (expressing concern
for witness's right of privacy). See also Free, 94 I11.2d at 415, 447 N.E.2d at 236 (evidence
of victim's family, including photograph, admissible because common sense tells us that murder
victims do not live in vacuum and they leave behind family members).
236. See King, 667 P.2d at 476 (only objection made was that photo inflamed passions of
jury against defendant); Snodgrass, 121 Ariz. at 412, 590 P.2d at 951 (only prejudice described
was arousing the jury against the defendant).
237. See FED. R. EviD. 404(b).
238. See Perry, 158 Ga. App. at 352-53, 280 S.E.2d at 392-93 (defendant charged with rape;
evidence he was seen masturbating said to have some relevance to prove identity of rapist
whom victim had already positively identified, therefore admissible); Chavis, 617 S.W.2d at
906-07 (defendant charged with rape; evidence he was snooping around a nearby apartment
24 hours earlier found relevant to show he was in the area, therefore admissible); Hammen,
87 Wis. 2d at 797-800, 275 N.W.2d at 713 (defendant charged with assault; evidence that he
was involved in drug deal before the assault had some probative value to show state of mind,
therefore admissible).
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State v. Ledet,23 9 a defendant was charged with knowingly driving the
getaway car in a robbery. The state introduced a gun not used in the
robbery that had been found on the driver's side of the car. The court

found it had some slight relevance, because the more guns that were present,
the more likely one of them would be used in the robbery. The court also
found the gun slightly relevant to show the defendant's knowledge that a
robbery would take place. He must have suspected something because he

chose to come armed. The gun was found admissible without balancing.
The refusal to balance is not just deference to the trial judge's discretion.

On those rare occasions when the state is able to appeal from a trial judge's
decision to exclude uncharged misconduct evidence, no such deference is
shown. The appeals courts usually reverse such pro-defense rulings and
order evidence of the defendant's prior misconduct admitted.l24 Similarly,

when the defendant tries to introduce evidence of someone else's misconduct,

242
it is routinely excluded even when clearly relevant.

The near uniformity of decisions allowing evidence of the defendant's
prior acts of misconduct can be explained because the situation again

presents a relatively easy political choice. Such evidence provides material
information about what happened and judges believe a limiting instruction
reduces the chance it will be misused; therefore it furthers the goal of

informed, accurate, decisionmaking.243 Allowing the prosecution to control
its selection of evidence and to strike hard blows is consistent with adversary

239. 337 So. 2d 1126 (La. 1976).
240. Id. Of course, the gun was not proved to be owned by the defendant, nor was the
defendant shown to be aware of its presence in the car. A co-defendant who admitted being
the robber and who corroborated Ledet's denial of knowledge that a robbery was occurring
was sentenced to five years. Ledet, who was only alleged to have driven the getaway car, got
20 years at hard labor without parole.
241. E.g., United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1981) (reversing pretrial order
in armed robbery case excluding from evidence a list of gun stores and ammunition because
defendant could not be connected to it); State v. White, 71 Or. App. 299, 692 P.2d 167 (1984)
(reversing pretrial order in arson case excluding evidence that defendant filed a post-fire
fraudulent insurance claim).
242. E.g., State v. Beachman, 189 Mont. 400, 404-05, 616 P.2d 337, 339-40 (1980) (evidence
that defendant smoked marijuana with prosecutor, offered as explanation why he fled jurisdiction, conceded to be relevant by appeals court, but held inadmissible). See also United
States v. Milstead, 671 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1982) (defense evidence of phttern of plea bargains
by government informer-witness to show bias was relevant, but excluded); Murdock v. State,
664 P.2d 589 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (defense evidence of witness's pattern of arrests and
lenient treatment by state relevant to show bias, but excluded).
243. E.g., State v. Rosenfeld, 93 Wis. 2d 325, 331-32, 286 N.W.2d 596, 599 (1980) (evidence
of possibly related act of bribery relevant and admitted pursuant to limiting instruction);
Sanville v. State, 593 P.2d 1340, 1345 (Wyo. 1979) (evidence of other bad checks written on
same closed account admissible to show intent, plan, and common scheme; cautionary instruction reduced prejudice). But see Wissler & Saks, On the Inefficiency of Limiting Instructions,
9 LAW & HuMAN BEHAVIOR 37, 41-44 (1985) (experiments demonstrate that limiting instructions
do not work).
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procedures. 2 4 Once the case gets to the appellate level, it is more efficient

to affirm than to order a new trial. Such evidence increases the chance of
a conviction, so it furthers the state's interest in legitimating its criminal
justice system. It coincides with the popular perception about what kinds

of evidence are relevant, so it avoids the appearance that relevant evidence
is being excluded by a legal system soft on crime.2 5 Against all these reasons

to approve the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence is the argument that it will prejudice the jury against the defendant, 2" the weak
argument that admitting the evidence wastes time when it is cumulative, 24
and the unpalatable argument that jurors might ignore their limiting instruction and misuse the evidence. 2 "
In some situations, however, the choices will be difficult. For example,
suppose the defense in a criminal case calls a psychologist as an expert
witness on the unreliability of eyewitness identifications. Arguments in favor
of admissibility include its relevancy and its compatibility with the adversarial process because of the ready availability of similar experts to the

other side. Arguments against admissibility include the inefficiency of allowing a battle of experts, the possibility that jurors will overvalue the
expert's testimony, and the fact that it undermines the legitimacy of the
criminal justice system that is based on the premise that eyewitnesses are
9
reliable. The choice is difficult, so courts have reached varying conclusions.2

244. E.g., State v. Gagne, 343 A.2d 186 (Me. 1975) (defendant charged with robbery, state
called three witnesses to prove he had participated in attempted rape of witness at unrelated
time, state entitled to rebut because defendant brought it up first); Clift, 339 So. 2d at 760
(defendant charged with possession of heroin; state proved defendant arrested for marijuana
which led eventually to heroin charge; state entitled to present to the jury the alleged criminal
act in its entirety).
245. E.g., State v. White, 71 Or. App. 299, 302, 692 P.2d 167, 169 (1984) (evidence of
misconduct necessary because state's case otherwise is weak).
246. E.g., People v. Grisham, 125 Mich. App. 280, 285-86, 335 N.W.2d 680, 683 (1983)
(thereby preventing the objective determination of guilt necessary to fair adversarial system);
State v. Eaton, 31 Or. App. 653, 655-57, 571 P.2d 173, 174-75 (1977) (carrying false driver's
license not likely to blacken defendant's character in minds of jury).
247. See State v. Kumpula, 355 N.W.2d 697, 703 (Minn. 1984) (photo of defendant in
prison yard offered to prove he used to have moustache held not prejudicial error despite fact
that it was cumulative of other evidence).
248. The evidence that jurors disregard limiting instructions is strong. See, e.g., Wissler &
Saks, supra note 243, at 41-44 (evidence of defendant's prior criminal record admitted for
limited purpose of impeachment found to have no effect on perception of credibility but did
affect conviction rate). However, the instruction satisfies the appearance of justice, and it is
difficult for a court to take the position that jurors cannot follow instructions because that
threatens the legitimacy of the entire trial system based on such instructions. See Rosenfeld,
93 Wis. 2d at 331-32, 286 N.W.2d at 599 (holding that limiting instruction "eliminated the
danger of possible prejudice"); Gagne, 343 A.2d at 195 (appeals court convinced that trial
judge's "unusually forceful [limiting] instruction must have deeply impressed the jury").
249. See Fosher, 590 F.2d at 383 (judge focused on concern that evidence would be
overvalued and therefore lead to an inaccurate verdict; testimony excluded); Rodriquez, 145
Ariz. at 167-68, 700 P.2d at 865-66 (court focused on fact that testimony undermined the
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Another difficult choice is whether to admit or exclude relevant evidence
of a civil party's insurance or other financial resources. For example,
suppose evidence is elicited that the person who took the plaintiff's statement
was an investigator for the defendant's insurance company. Such evidence
is relevant to show bias and to explain the complete circumstances of the
taking of the statement, although it discloses the defendant's insured status

to the jury.20 Arguments in favor of admissibility include its relevancy, the
inefficiency of ordering a new trial, the state's interest in spreading the risk
of loss through insurance, and the fact that impeachment is basic to the
adversarial trial process. Arguments against admissibility include the possi-

bilities of inaccurate verdicts if jurors award damages on the basis of
insurance rather than liability, of upsetting the adversarial balance if it
causes jurors to favor the plaintiff, and of undermining the ideology of
equal justice regardless of wealth. Again, courts reach quite different
decisions depending on which values they decide are the more important.2'
As these examples demonstrate, viewing the decision to admit evidence

that is simultaneously relevant and prejudicial as a political choice does not
necessarily lead to a reduction in the variability of decisions from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction. Each jurisdiction is free to make its own political choices.
It might, however, reduce the variability of decisions within particular
jurisdictions.2 . 2 If the appellate courts would recognize the necessity to make
explicit political choices when evidence is both relevant and prejudicial, it
would be an advantage compared to the balancing test.
The balancing metaphor allows appellate courts to avoid making policy

decisions about the admissibility of controversial evidence, such as expert
testimony on the unreliability of eyewitnesses,253 prosthetic devices, 254 and

reliability of witness testimony; excluded it); Chapple, 135 Ariz. at 290-97, 660 P.2d at 121824 (court focused on relevancy and how evidence would affect verdict accuracy, found it
admissible).
250. See FED. R. Evm. 411 (evidence of insurance not required to be excluded if offered
to show bias or other relevant purpose).
251. See Pagel v. Yates, 128 II1. App. 3d 897, 902, 471 N.E.2d 946, 951 (1984) (focused
on tendency of evidence to cause jury to favor plaintiff and to produce inaccurate verdicts,
held evidence should have been excluded); Mac Tyres, Inc. v. Vigil, 92 N.M. 446, 448, 589
P.2d 1037, 1039 (1979) (focuses on impeachment as being fundamental to fair adversarial
procedure, admissible); Burnett v. Caho, 7 IlL. App. 3d 266, 273, 285 N.E.2d 619, 625 (1972)
(focuses on adversarial process and culpability of plaintiff, admissible); Leotta, 8 N.Y.2d at
461-62, 171 N.E.2d at 460, 209 N.S.Y.2d at 312-13 (focuses on advancing factually accurate
verdicts, admissible); Rutherford v. Gilchrist, 218 Iowa 1169, 1171-75, 255 N.W. 517-19 (1934)
(focused on tendency to divert jury from proper issues, excluded).
252. Compare Rodriquez, 145 Ariz. at 167-68, 700 P.2d at 865-66 (expert testimony on
unreliability of eyewitnesses excluded) with Chapple, 135 Ariz. at 290-97, 660 P.2d at 1218-24
(expert testimony on unreliability of eyewitnesses admissible).
253. See Fosher, 590 F.2d at 383 (avoids issue by saying balancing is in discretion of trial
judge).
254. Cope v. Sevigny, 289 A.2d 682, 689 (Me. 1972) (avoids issue by saying that balancing
is for trial court).
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statistics concerning child abuse.251 As long as such evidence possesses both
probative value and prejudicial effect in uncertain amounts, then any
decision the trial court makes can be justified as the result of balancing.
The appeals court need never deal with the important policy matters
underlying the issue. By not establishing standards, the appeals courts
deprive trial judges of guidance. Without guidance and precedent, consistent
predictable rulings become virtually impossible.
The political-choice model also is consistent with general legal theory and
with other trial procedures. It reflects the usual hierarchy of the legal
system, in which the appellate courts make decisions based on policy
considerations which the trial courts are supposed to apply.2 6 It also parallels
the procedure used to resolve disputes about whether to limit other trial
practices claimed to cause prejudice. For example, most appellate courts do
not avoid the conflict over whether to limit partisan participation in the
voir dire of prospective jurors. They do not allow each trial judge to reach
her own balance, but resolve the matter by making a political choice between
efficiency and adversariness.2 7 Most appellate courts do not avoid the
conflict over whether to allow the parties to inform the jury during opening
statements of the inflated claims made in the pleadings. They do not ask
each trial judge to engage in balancing, but make the choice themselves
between adversarial freedom and the danger of confusing the jury. 8 Neither
do most appellate courts leave trial judges to decide for themselves whether
to permit a prosecutor in closing arguments to comment on the defendant's
failure to produce evidence of his innocence. Again, they provide guidance
to the lower courts. 9 In each instance, the appellate courts chose among
conflicting political values.
CONCLUSION
One of the primary vehicles for separating admissible from excludable
evidence is the prejudice rule. In its commonest form, it allocates this
winnowing task to the trial judge, who is supposed to balance the relevance

255. State v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 575-76, 683 P.2d 173, 180 (1984) (issue of scientific
reliability avoided by deferring to trial court's balancing).
256. See, e.g., R. Dwoaxx, supra note 3, at 31-39.
257. Compare Commonwealth v. Estremera, 383 Mass. 382, 389-91, 419 N.E.2d 835, 84041 (1981) (defendant has no right to ask questions) with People v. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d 392,
628 P.2d 869, 174 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1981) (ruling that defendant has a right to ask voir dire
questions).
258. Compare Haynes v. Monroe Plumbing & Heating Co., 48 Mich. App. 707, 211 N.W.2d
88 (1973) (permitting pleadings to be read) with Zindrick v. Drake, 75 Ill. App. 3d 702, 393
N.E.2d 1277 (1979) (may not refer to ad damnum clause).
259. Compare United States v. Schultz, 698 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1983) (failure to call alibi
witness may be commented on) with State v. Purvis, 525 S.W.2d 590 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975)
(comment prohibited).
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of evidence against vaguely defined prejudicial effects. Unfortunately, trial
judges reach quite different decisions whether to admit such evidence as
prior misconduct by a criminal defendant, the financial resources of civil
litigants, the effect of a crime on the victim's family, and expert testimony
on the unreliability of eyewitness identifications.
One reason for the inconsistent decisions is lack of agreement about the
proper meaning of prejudice. Some courts exclude evidence because it
arouses the jury's emotions, wastes time, or harms one of the parties.
Others declare that emotionalism, inefficiency, and harm to the parties are
not appropriate reasons for excluding relevant evidence. Another reason for
the disarray may lie in conceptualizing the decisionmaking procedure as a
balancing test. Relevance and prejudicial effect are incommensurable qualities that have no common measurement. Invoking the balancing metaphor
masks the difficult political nature of the choices involved. Delegating broad
power to trial judges is inconsistent with the usual hierarchy of the legal
system in which trial judges exercise reviewable discretion within guidelines
set by higher courts. It invites inconsistent rulings influenced by the judges'
personal biases.
Disagreements over the appropriate meaning of prejudice can be resolved
by grounding the definition in a comprehensive theory of the multiple
functions of trials. That theory suggests that trials are guided by four
principles simultaneously: adversariness, efficiency, verdict accuracy, and
social-political symbolism. Evidence is prejudicial if it conflicts with any of
these values.
The problems associated with the balancing test can be minimized by
using an alternative procedural paradigm: political choice. The politicalchoice model is based on two premises. First, a decision to admit or exclude
prejudicial evidence necessarily advances some values at the expense of
others. That is a political choice. Second, this kind of policy decision is
more appropriately made by appellate courts than by individual trial judges.
Therefore, the appellate courts should accept their responsibility to make
difficult decisions. They should articulate what values would be served by
admitting or excluding certain types of evidence, and what values would be
compromised, and then clearly choose between them. This would provide
much clearer guidance to trial judges, minimize the role played by individual
judges' biases, and reduce the variability in their decisions.

